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INTRODUCTION
At this moment of unprecedented decline of local news and amplified
attacks on journalists, it has become clear to many that the Fourth Estate no
longer has the social or economic protection it once enjoyed. Scholarly
attention is thus increasingly turning to the role of the Constitution as the
ultimate protector of the American free press.1 The problem, however, is
*

RonNell Andersen Jones is the Lee E. Teitelbaum Chair & Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney
College of Law, University of Utah Law School and an Affiliated Fellow at Yale Law
School’s Information Society Project. Sonja R. West is the Otis Brumby Distinguished
Professor in First Amendment Law, University of Georgia School of Law. The authors thank
Maria Eliot, Savanna Nolan, Emily Nuvan, Lydia Owens Rytting, Ken Peterson, Joseph
Scarborough, and Jake Shapiro for their research assistance. They owe a special debt of
gratitude to Ryan Black for his expertise and assistance.
1 See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, SAVING THE NEWS: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CALLS FOR
GOVERNMENT ACTION TO PRESERVE FREEDOM OF SPEECH (2021) (arguing that the First
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that all of these conversations are built on the seemingly basic—but actually
untested—assumption that the United States Supreme Court continues to
recognize the First Amendment’s guarantee of the “freedom of the press.”
While once a regularly referenced concept in Supreme Court opinions, the
“freedom of the press,” as both an explicitly recognized right and a
functional constitutional tool, is disappearing from the Court’s lexicon. It
is doing so in spite of the First Amendment’s specific textual guarantee of
it2 and in spite of the Roberts Court’s embrace of First Amendment
expansiveness in other areas.3 In a pattern that has gone largely unnoticed,
the Court today virtually never even acknowledges the existence of the right
to press freedom.
This Article identifies, tracks, and analyzes this trend. Our individually
coded dataset, capturing every paragraph mentioning the press written by
all 114 Justices in the 235-year history of the Court, shows that in the last
generation the Court’s references to the constitutional right of press
freedom have dramatically declined. Indeed, they are now lower than at any
other moment since the incorporation of the First Amendment.
The jurisprudential and rhetorical desertion of this right is evident in every
quantitative and qualitative measure we analyzed. Press freedom was once
a commonly adopted framework, with the Court readily acknowledging it,
both on its own and as a counterpart to freedom of speech. It was regularly
mentioned not only in cases focused on the media but also in cases not
involving the press—including in lists of wider constitutional rights that the
Court recognizes and values. But our data reveal that these practices are a
thing of the past. The current Court rarely references press freedom and
even more rarely references it in any context that expands the conceptual
scope of the right or advances the real-world protection of newsgatherers.
Gone are not only the ringing, positive endorsements of freedom of the
press—situating it as valuable, important, or central to our democracy—but
also the bare acknowledgement of the concept at all. A close investigation
of the patterns of individual Justices, moreover, reveals not only that there
are no true advocates of the right on the current Court but also that most of

Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press may hold meaning in the new media
ecosystem as a constitutional support for more robust funding of public media and other
reforms); RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Freedom of the Press in PostTruthism America, 98 WASH. U. L. REV 419 (2020) (arguing that Press Clause protection
should be informed by unique functions that enhance the marketplace of ideas for news
consumers); Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434 (2014).
2
See U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech
or of the press”) (emphasis added).
3
See infra Part V.A.
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the current Justices have rarely, if ever, mentioned it in any context. The
“freedom of the press” has simply disappeared at the Court.
This Article addresses the overpowering evidence of this decline and
explores the possible causes of it. Specifically, it shows how the data belie
some potential and initially appealing explanations for these trends, such as
the suggestions that the findings are solely a result of shifts in ideological
makeup of the Court, the Court’s smaller press-related docket, or a reliance
on settled law in the area. It also highlights the ways in which the
evaporation of this major expressive-freedom principle is a significant
deviation from the expansive First Amendment jurisprudence that some
have suggested is a hallmark of the Roberts Court. This Court, which is
otherwise boundary-pushing in extending the scope and contours of First
Amendment protection, has quietly erased a major First Amendment value
from the conversation. In light of this disappearance, the newly revived
effort to invoke the Constitution as a tool for preserving the press function
and the flow of information on matters of public concern may face
additional hurdles.
The Article proceeds in six Parts. Part I describes the current consequential
moment for the American press and the scholarly groundswell that
motivates an investigation of the Court’s patterns of acknowledging
freedom of the press. Part II outlines the methodology for the study. Part
III describes the overall patterns revealed in the data about the Court’s
recognition of the right, including the tone the Justices have used when
discussing freedom of the press and the numbers of Justices over the course
of history who have referenced it in their opinions. It situates these
rhetorical patterns within the Court’s jurisprudential First Amendment case
law to paint the first comprehensive picture of the role the concept of press
freedom has played. Part IV explores in greater depth the precipitous
decline in these mentions. It reveals both the quantitative frequency data
and the compounding qualitative data that combine to demonstrate the stark
disappearance from the Supreme Court’s working vocabulary of any
concept of freedom of the press. Part V examines a set of potential
explanations for the trends and uses additional data gathered in the project
to interrogate them. Part VI concludes.
I. A RENEWED FOCUS ON PRESS FREEDOM
Caught inside a perfect storm of economic, cultural, technological and
political forces, the American free press is at a breaking point. Without risk
of exaggeration, we can say that our country’s news media landscape is
being distorted and destroyed before our very eyes—a swift and troubling
onslaught that has left scholars and commentators from a number of fields
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scrambling to draw attention to the problem and search for solutions. 4
Central to these discussions is a renewed scholarly focus on the
constitutional right to “freedom of the press” as an enduring and longrecognized First Amendment value and as a potential legal tool for
safeguarding the press function into the future.
The causes of this crisis of the press and democracy are varied, and the
effects are widespread. They include harms that have already befallen the
press and additional dangers that may still be brewing. An overarching
factor, however, is the sharp financial downturn that has pummeled the
news industry over the last two decades.5 With few exceptions, the once
economically prosperous news business of the twentieth century is no more.
On almost every metric, the business side of journalism has fallen
precipitously: advertising revenues are down,6 subscriptions are down,7
newsrooms are shrinking,8 and newspapers are shuttering.9 The newspapers
4 See, e.g., The Crisis of the Press and Democracy: Saving the Press Function, YALE INFO.

SOC’Y PROJECT (Mar. 19, 2021), https://law.yale.edu/isp/initiatives/floyd-abrams-institutefreedom-expression/crisis-press-and-democracy-saving-press-function (reporting on an
academic conference on the topic of “Saving the Press Function”); Media Apocalypse, YALE
INFO. SOC’Y PROJECT, https://law.yale.edu/isp/initiatives/floyd-abrams-institute-freedomexpression/media-apocalypse (highlighting a video series featuring “discussions with
experts about the current crisis roiling journalism in the United States and what we might
do about it”) (last visited June 8, 2021).
5
See Penelope Muse Abernathy, News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers; Will Local News
Survive?,
https://www.usnewsdeserts.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/2020_News_Deserts_and_Ghost_Newspapers.pdf (“In only two
decades, successive technological and economic assaults have destroyed the for-profit
business model that sustained local journalism in this country for two centuries. Hundreds
of news organizations—century-old newspapers as well as nascent digital sites—have
vanished.”).
6
See Michael Barthel, Newspaper Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR., MEDIA & NEWS (July 9,
2019), https://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/newspapers/ (“The total estimated advertising
revenue for the newspaper industry in 2018 was $14.3 billion . . . This is down 13% from
2017.”).
7
See Michael Barthel, Newspaper Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR., MEDIA & NEWS (July 9,
2019), https://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/newspapers/, (noting lower “[e]stimated
advertising and circulation revenue of the newspaper industry.”).
8
See Abernathy, News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers, supra n. __ (stating that “[i]n the 15
years leading up to 2020, more than one-fourth of the country’s newspapers disappeared,
[and,] [s]imultaneously, half of all local journalists disappeared, as round after round of
layoffs have left many surviving papers – the gutsy dailies and weeklies that had won
accolades and Pulitzer Prizes for their reporting – mere “ghosts,” or shells of their former
selves.”); Elizabeth Grieco, U.S. Newspapers Have Shed Half of Their Newsroom
Employees Since 2008, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 20, 2020) https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/04/20/u-s-newsroom-employment-has-dropped-by-a-quarter-since-2008/.
9
See Abernathy, News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers, supra n. __ ; Michael Barthel,
Newspaper Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR., MEDIA & NEWS (July 9, 2019),
https://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/newspapers/.
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that have survived are becoming “ghosts” of their prior selves and whittled
to the bone by their new owners, who are often private investment firms
seeking quick profit through the consolidation and cannibalization of
struggling papers.10 The arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic in the spring
of 2020 only brought more economic hardship to the industry and “turbocharged” its financial downfall.11
Much of the news industry’s commercial troubles came with the rise of the
digital age, when the for-profit, advertising-based business model that long
buoyed news organizations suddenly collapsed. As described by Penelope
Muse Abernathy, “the intrusive, always-on internet swiftly siphoned off
readers, advertisers and profits. With Facebook and Google capturing the
vast majority of digital revenue in many communities today, traditional
news organizations, as well as online outlets, have been reduced to fighting
over the digital scraps.”12 How Americans consumed their news swiftly
changed as well. Algorithms increasingly dictated what stories made their
way to readers’ eyes,13 while the draw of reliably popular content—like
sports and weather—became unbundled from the hard news of public
concern, making it harder for the former to financially support the latter.14
No segment of the press has been harder hit by the economic challenges
than local news,15 a phenomenon that has led to the nationwide rise of
10

See Joe Pompeo, The Hedge Fund Vampire that Bleeds Newspapers Dry Now Has the
Chicago Tribune by the Throat, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/02/hedge-fund-vampire-alden-global-capital-thatbleeds-newspapers-dry-has-chicago-tribune-by-the-throat (describing one hedge fund
manager’s “draconian playbook” as: “buy distressed newspapers on the cheap, cut the shit
out of them, and reap the profits that can still be made from print advertising.”); See also
Abernathy, News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers, supra n. __ (noting that “[t]oday, four
large firms own 15 percent of the country’s papers).
11
See Abernathy, News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers, supra n. __ at 8 (stating the fear
that the pandemic may amount to an “‘extinction-level event’ that destroys many of the
survivors and newcomers and leads to the collapse of the country’s local news ecosystem.”).
12
See id.
13
See Erin Carroll, Making News: Balancing Newsworthiness and Privacy in the Age of
Algorithms, 106 GEO. L.J. 69 (2017).
14
See David Von Drehle, What Happens When a Local Newspaper Dies, WASH. POST (May
8,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-happens-when-a-localnewspaper-dies/2018/05/08/d898181a-52e8-11e8-abd8-265bd07a9859_story.html (stating
that “[w]hat newspapers bundled, the Internet has unbundled.”); Abernathy, News Deserts
and Ghost Newspapers, supra n. __ (noting that “[p]ublic service journalism—investigative
and analytical reporting on matters of critical importance, such as education, the
environment, politics and the economy—fails to gain traction on the internet.”).
15 Abernathy, News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers, supra n. __ ; Tom Sites, About 1,300
U.S. Communities Have Totally Lost News Coverage, UNC News Desert Study Finds,
POYNTER (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.poynter.org/business-work/2018/about-1300-u-scommunities-have-totally-lost-news-coverage-unc-news-desert-study-finds/.
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“news deserts.”16 According to a report from the University of North
Carolina, the country has since 2005 lost a quarter of its local newspapers—
the entities that “have historically been the prime source of credible and
critical news and information in most small and mid-sized communities.”17
The loss of local newspapers has raised particular concerns among press
scholars and commentators because “[i]t is through local journalism that
communities stay connected to and informed about what is happening in
their backyards—especially in their schools, their governments, and other
critical institutions and infrastructures.”18
Meanwhile, the press has faced an onslaught of attacks—unparalleled in
modern times—that have been led and cheered by political actors.19 The
new moment of heightened scholarly concern about press freedom emerged
in part as a result of a turbulent Trump administration, during which the
press found itself subjected to extraordinary attack from the highest levels
of government itself.20 Branded as “fake news” and “enemies of the
people,”21 the press faced an unprecedented effort to discredit its work and
its standing within the nation’s democratic framework, exacerbating an
already deep domestic partisan divide on the question of press
trustworthiness22 and causing the United States’ international press16

See Abernathy, News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers, supra n. __ (defining a news desert
as “a community, either rural or urban, where residents have very limited access to the sort
of credible and comprehensive news and information that feed democracy at the grassroots
level.”).
17
Id.
18
VICTOR PICKARD, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT JOURNALISM: CONFRONTING THE
MISINFORMATION SOCIETY (2020).
19
See, e.g., David Smith, ‘That's a Nasty, Snarky Question’: Trump’s Media Assault Rages
on in Midst of Coronavirus Crisis, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/01/us-coronavirus-outbreak-donald-trumpmedia-latest; Jay Rosen, America’s Press and the Asymmetric War for Truth, THE N.Y. REV.
(Nov. 1, 2020), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2020/11/01/americas-press-and-theasymmetric-war-for-truth/ (stating that “[t]he conflict with honest journalism is structural.
To be its dwindling self, the GOP has to also be at war with the press, unless of course the
press folds under pressure.”).
20
RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction and the Press, 49 ARIZ.
ST. L. J. 1301, 1327–28 (2017).
21

Roy S. Gutterman, After Four Damaging Years, Biden Must Restore Press Freedom,
SYRACUSE.COM (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.syracuse.com/opinion/2020/12/after-4damaging-years-biden-must-restore-press-freedom-roy-sgutterman.html?_ga=2.221130910.729064608.1612977547-1278528241.1612977547.
22
See Megan Brenan, Americans Remain Distrustful of Mass Media, GALLUP (Sept. 30,
2020),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/321116/americans-remain-distrustful-massmedia.aspx; Jeffrey Gottfried, Galen Stocking, Elizabeth Grieco, Mason Walker, Maya
Khuzam, & Amy Mitchell, Trusting the News Media in the Trump Era, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.journalism.org/2019/12/12/trusting-the-news-media-in-thetrump-era/; Andrew Guess, Brendan Nyhan, & Jason Reifler, You're Fake News! The 2017
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freedom ranking to plummet. 23 Trump’s rhetoric included comments
celebrating the use of force by police against journalists covering protests,24
and scholars and advocacy groups have noted more broadly that threats and
violent attacks against reporters have skyrocketed.25
Indeed, journalists today, in the course of their work, are increasingly at
risk of verbal and physical assaults from law enforcement officers26 or

Poynter Media Trust Survey, POYNTER
(Nov.
29,
2017),
https://poyntercdn.blob.core.windows.net/files/PoynterMediaTrustSurvey2017.pdf (noting
that Republicans and Trump supporters “have far more negative attitudes toward the press
than Democrats and Trump opponents.”). See also Lili Levi, Real “Fake News” and Fake
“Fake News”, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 232, 261–62 (2017) (explaining that forty-four
percent—almost half—of Americans (and 74 percent of Republicans) believe that
the news media fabricate stories about Trump. A substantial minority—31 percent—in a
recent survey indicate agreement with Trump's tweet that the media are the “enemy” and
“keep political leaders from doing their jobs.” The survey also shows that “one in four
Americans (25 percent) endorses draconian limitations on press freedom.”).
23
Sasha Ingber, The U.S. Now Ranks as a ‘Problematic’ Place for Journalists, NPR (Apr.
18,
2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/18/714625907/the-u-s-now-ranks-as-aproblematic-place-for-journalists (noting that Reporters Without Borders downgraded the
United States to a “problematic” place for journalists and ranked the U.S. 48 out of 180 on
the organization’s annual World Press Freedom Index).
24 Brett Samuels, Trump Mocks Reporters Who Were Roughed up by Police During
Protests, THE HILL (Sept. 22, 2020, 9:07 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/media/517713trump-mocks-reporters-who-were-roughed-up-by-police-during-protests.
25
See
generally
Quick
Facts,
U.S.
PRESS
FREEDOM
TRACKER,
https://pressfreedomtracker.us/; [Erin Carroll, Obstruction of Journalism (forthcoming
2021)].
26 See, e.g., Pulitzer Prize-Winning Photojournalist Shoved to the Ground by LAPD, U.S.
PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER (May 31, 2020), https://pressfreedomtracker.us/allincidents/pulitzer-prize-winning-photojournalist-shoved-ground-lapd/; Marc Tracy &
Rachel Abrams, Police Target Journalists as Trump Blames ‘Lamestream Media’ for
Protests,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
1,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/01/business/media/reporters-protests-georgefloyd.html; Katie Shepherd, This Portland Journalist Has Been Gassed and Shoved by
Federal
Officers.
She’s
Only
17.,
WASH. POST
(July
23,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/07/23/portland-protests-teenage-reporter/;
Courtney Douglas, Amid Black Lives Matter Protests, A Crushing Moment for Journalists
Facing Record Attacks, Arrests at the Hands of Law Enforcement, REPORTERS COMM. (Sept.
4, 2020), https://www.rcfp.org/black-lives-matter-press-freedom/; Clare Duffy, Journalist
Partially Blinded While Covering Protests: There's No Way They Could Have Mistaken Me
for
Anything
but
Press,
CNN
(June
14,
2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/14/media/linda-tirado-reliable/index.html.
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members of the public.27 They are being arrested,28 charged,29 and tried30
for crimes. They are being harassed31 and threatened.32
It is against this backdrop that press scholars, commentators, and advocates
have come together in a renewed effort to preserve the press function in
America.33 Drawing attention to what they fear is a growing crisis,
academics from a number of fields have launched a burgeoning scholarly
movement aimed at guaranteeing the continuation of newsgathering and
accurate information-sharing in America,34 with new and more focused
conversations about the ways the First Amendment’s freedom of the press
might be a tool in that effort.

27AP Photojournalist Assaulted by Bystander During Event In Philadelphia, U.S. PRESS

FREEDOM TRACKER (June 4, 2020), https://pressfreedomtracker.us/all-incidents/apphotojournalist-assaulted-bystander-during-event-philadelphia/; Reporter Assaulted Live on
Air at Phoenix Protest, U.S. PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER (May 29, 2020),
https://pressfreedomtracker.us/all-incidents/reporter-assaulted-live-air-phoenix-protest/;
Trump Supporter Assaults, Knocks Phone Out of Journalist’s Hands, U.S. PRESS FREEDOM
TRACKER (Sept. 30, 2020), https://pressfreedomtracker.us/all-incidents/trump-supportersassaults-knocks-phone-out-of-journalists-hands/; Broadcast Journalist Stabbed with
Scissors While Reporting in Boston, U.S. PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER (Sept. 6, 2020),
https://pressfreedomtracker.us/all-incidents/broadcast-journalist-stabbed-scissors-whilereporting-boston/; Reporter Hit with Wooden Board at New York’s Occupy City Hall
Protest, U.S. PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER (July 12, 2020), https://pressfreedomtracker.us/allincidents/reporter-hit-with-wooden-board-at-new-yorks-occupy-city-hall-protest/.
28
Arrest/Criminal
Charge,
U.S.
PRESS
FREEDOM
TRACKER,
https://pressfreedomtracker.us/arrest-criminal-charge/ (showing 142 arrests or detainments
of journalists in 2020) (last visited Jan. 20, 2022).
29
U.S.
PRESS
FREEDOM
TRACKER,
https://pressfreedomtracker.us/allincidents/?categories=4&status_of_charges=CHARGES_PENDING
(showing
17
journalists currently facing criminal charges).
30
See William Morris, 'The Jury Made the Right Decision': Reporter Andrea Sahouri
Acquitted in Trial Stemming from Arrest as She Covered Protest, DES MOINES REG. (March
10, 2021), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2021/03/10/andrea-sahouritrial-des-moines-register-reporter-acquitted-george-floyd-protest-arrest/6933780002/.
31
See U.S. PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER, https://pressfreedomtracker.us/allincidents/journalists-face-harassment-while-covering-coronavirus/ (discussing incidents of
harassment of journalists while covering coronavirus).
32
Katherine Jacobsen & Lucy Westcott, ‘Three People Threatened to Shoot Me.’
Journalists Describe Covering Mob Violence at the US Capitol, CPJ (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://cpj.org/2021/01/three-people-threatened-to-shoot-me-journalists-describe-coveringmob-violence-at-the-us-capitol/.
33
See Abernathy, News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers, supra n. __ (quoting PEN
America’s Viktorya Vilk stating that “[t]hings are so bad, we need an all-of-the-above
approach.”).
34 See, e.g., The Crisis of the Press and Democracy: Saving the Press Function, YALE L.
SCH. INFO. SOC’Y PROJECT, https://law.yale.edu/isp/initiatives/floyd-abrams-institutefreedom-expression/crisis-press-and-democracy-saving-press-function.
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To this end, scholars are questioning more closely the longstanding
components of the U.S. press freedom structure35 and re-exploring the
underpinnings of press freedom values in areas where courts have long
tussled with the principle, like reporter’s privilege36 and national security.37
But they are also identifying and grappling with complex questions of the
role of the press and press freedom in new media and legal landscapes.
They are exploring the interrelationship between changing media
structures, political polarization, the decline of reliable news, and the
American free press—interrogating the boundaries of press freedom in the
face of propaganda threats38 and social media companies’ incentives.39
They are investigating how organizational operational models40 and
monopolistic concentrations of power have an impact on free-press values
in this ecosystem.41 And they are thinking creatively about the relationships
between constitutional freedom of the press and democratic values, with
proposals for adopting new models of public media,42 for enacting reforms
35

RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, The Fragility of the Free American Press,
Nw. U. L. Rev. (2017).
36 See, e.g., RonNell Andersen Jones, Rethinking Reporter's Privilege, 11 MICH. L. REV.
1221 (2013) (describing the Supreme Court’s investigation of the unique freedom of the
press reasons for protecting journalists’ ability to preserve source confidentiality).
37 See Heidi Kitrosser & David Schulz, A House Built on Sand: The Constitutional Infirmity
of Espionage Act Prosecutions for Leaking to the Press, 19 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (describing use of the Espionage Act to target those who leak to the
press and the failure of the courts to address serious First Amendment concerns in those
prosecutions).
38 See YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION,
AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS (2018) (arguing that a propaganda feedback
loop in American conservative media has radicalized the right-wing ecosystem and rendered
it susceptible to both foreign and domestic propaganda efforts).
39 See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTISOCIAL MEDIA: HOW F ACEBOOK DISCONNECTS US AND
UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY (2018) (describing the ways that social media has fostered the
deterioration of democracy by undermining respectable journalism).
40 See Emily Bell & Taylor Owen, with Peter Brown, Codi Hauka & Nushin Rashidian, The
Platform Press: How Silicon Valley Reengineered Journalism, TOW CTR. FOR DIG.
JOURNALISM,
COLUM.
JOURNALISM
SCH.
(2017),
http://towcenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/The_Platform_Press_Tow_Report_2017.pdf (describing the
evolution of companies like Google and Facebook beyond a distribution role and the
complex question of private platform control over what audiences and what type of
journalism occurs).
41 See Lina Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 C OLUM. L. REV. 973
(2019) (highlighting the risks of a small number of digital platforms mediating a larger
percentage of online communications and acting as both a platform and a provider of
communication services on it, creating a conflict of interest that platforms exploit to
entrench their dominance and thwart competition).
42 See VICTOR PICKARD, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT JOURNALISM (2019) (arguing that the era of
misinformation is symptomatic of the advertising-based commercial media model in the
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designed to preserve core press functions,43 and for making a free press
more reflective of the needs of the wider citizenry.44
Some of this scholarship actively urges the courts to put the constitutional
right of press freedom to new analytical use. So, for example, in her recent
work, former Harvard Law School dean Martha Minow invokes the First
Amendment’s Press Clause in support of a wide array of reforms to ensure
the flow of information on matters of public concern in the new media
landscape.45 In her new book, Saving the News,46 Minow argues that
government regulations to decrease concentration of platform ownership,
to build a new “fairness doctrine,” or to support news initiatives with robust
public funding, are not merely good policy, but constitutional necessities
for fulfilling the wider purpose of the First Amendment guarantee of
freedom of the press in a modern media ecosystem. First Amendment
challenges that might be raised to regulation of private speech platforms,
Minow argues, can be countered with the weight of First Amendment press
freedom values. Her arguments, like those of other scholars at this intense
moment of press-freedom focus, invite an investigation of the role of the
freedom of the press in our wider constitutional system.
Indeed, other scholarship, including our own, has urged an even more
aggressive invigoration of the Press Clause as an affirmative protection for
acts of newsgathering, the enhancement of government accountability,47
United States and that democracy demands a publicly owned and democratically governed
media system).
43 Steve Waldman, Curing Local News for Good, C OLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (March 31,
2020), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/local-news-rescue-plan.php (outlining governmental
actions that might spur structural relief to sustain newsgathering, including IRS decisions
on newspaper nonprofit status, reforms to bankruptcy and pension law, direct aid to
journalists, and government spending on advertising in support of local news).
44 James Hamilton & F. Morgan, Poor Information: How Economics Affects the Information
Lives of Low-Income Individuals, INTL. J. OF COMM. (2018).
45 See Martha Minow, The Changing Ecosystem of News and Challenges for Freedom of
the Press, 64 LOYOLA L. REV. 499 (2019) (addressing ways that transformations in
technology, economics, and communications jeopardize production of news that is essential
in a democratic society).
46
MARTHA MINOW, SAVING THE NEWS: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CALLS FOR GOVERNMENT
ACTION TO PRESERVE FREEDOM OF SPEECH (2021) (arguing that the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of the press may hold meaning in the new media ecosystem as a
constitutional support for more robust funding of public media and other reforms).
47 See Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434 (2014) (arguing for
the definition of press speakers who can uniquely invoke Press Clause protection because
they fulfill specific roles of informing the public on newsworthy matters and providing a
check on the government and powerful); Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58
UCLA L. REV. 1025 (2011) (advancing a proposal to embrace press exceptionalism through
a narrow definition of “the press” that reduces overlap between press and speech and views
the Press Clause as having independent significance).
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and the performance of functions that overcome the information-processing
and truth-seeking limitations of individual press consumers in the
marketplace of ideas.48 The theoretical approaches proposed in these
scholarly conversations are making their way into concrete arguments
before the courts, which are being asked to consider the scope and contours
of constitutional press freedom protections in new ways.49
The inquiries in this important movement—plumbing the depths of what
the constitutional right of freedom of the press means, how it operates, and
who it protects—address the issue from many different vantage points. But
the baseline of all of these inquiries is a shared one: the existence and
universal legal recognition of some foundational principle of freedom of
the press, about which deeper scholarly conversation is warranted.
If that baseline does not exist—if the Court is in the process of erasing the
First Amendment right to press freedom altogether—then the conversations
in this space face an additional important hurdle. The scholarly movement
to make something more of the constitutional freedom of the press
presupposes a Court that is, at a minimum, amenable to the bare concept of
a constitutional freedom of the press.
II. METHODOLOGY
The findings reported here were gathered in a large-scale project designed
to code every press reference in all opinions 50 by Justices of the U.S.

48 See RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Freedom of the Press in Post-Truthism

America, 98 WASH. U. L. REV 419 (2020) (arguing the need for protection of the press as a
market-enhancing institution and exploring the market-enhancing functions that should
qualify an institutional actor as “the press” for purposes of that Press Clause protection); See
RonNell Andersen Jones, Press Speakers and the First Amendment Rights of Listeners, 90
U. COLO. L. REV. 499 (2019) (arguing press speakers engage in special institutional First
Amendment activities on behalf of audiences and perform a vital proxy role for listeners
whose direct First Amendment access interests are fulfilled through the First Amendment
activities of their press partners).
49 See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae Thirteen Scholars and Practitioners of First Amendment
Law,
Index
Newspapers
v.
Portland, 20-35739
(9th
Cir),
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/isp/oregon_amicus.pdf (advancing a
reading of the First Amendment’s Press Clause).
50 The Westlaw “OPINION” database, used to create the dataset, captures all majority,
dissenting, and concurring opinions as well as all other written materials from individual
Justices that were published in the U.S. Reports, including dissents from denial of certiorari
and statements associated with recusal decisions and stay applications. The specific search
syntax used (without the leading and ending quotation marks) was as follows: “adv:
OPINION(#press or media or newspaper or "fourth estate" or journalis! or reporter or
newspaperman or newsman or pressman or (news /2 (gather! or magazine or outlet or
organization or service or coverage or article or story or cycle or broadcast!)))”.
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Supreme Court since 1784.51 The project explores 8,792 total
characterizations of the press in the writings of 114 Justices over the course
of 235 years.52
The dataset includes every paragraph in which a Justice of the Court spoke
in any way about the press or the press function. Decisions on inclusion
were shaped by the Court’s own identifications of those functions over
time,53 using a wide set of synonymous terms for those concepts54 and
including references to both traditional, legacy media and other performers
of the press function. Coders read each of these 5,250 paragraphs and
logged positive, negative, and neutral tonal variations within eight common
press-related frames. Seven of the eight frames tracked by coders were
sweepingly topical—capturing, for example, all mentions of interactions
between the press and the justice system or all narratives involving possible
regulation of the press. But one frame captured a linguistically and
conceptually precise legal concept: a constitutional freedom of the press.
This Article focuses on this data.
Coders recorded this frame every time a Justice of the Court mentioned the
concept of a free press or freedom of the press in any way. The most
common formulations of this across the whole set of data are direct
references to the right of “freedom of the press”55 or verbatim quotes of the
First Amendment’s phrasing, “freedom of speech, or of the press.”56 But
51

The studied period ran from 1784 through July 2020, when the Court completed October
Term 2019. The first reference to the press found in this studied period occurred in 1821.
The first reference to the concept of freedom of the press was that same term. See Anderson
v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 232 (1821) (referencing “the liberty of speech and of the press”).
52
For an extended discussion of the wider project methodology, see RonNell Andersen
Jones & Sonja R. West, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Characterizations of the Press: An
Empirical Study, 100 N. CAROLINA L. REV. 101 (forthcoming 2022).
53
So, for example, the dataset includes modern paragraphs that do not involve traditional
press outlets but speak of the performance of the newsgathering function by other actors.
See, e.g., Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1740 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(referencing the possibility of a “citizen journalist” recording police with a cell phone
camera and streaming the footage on social media).
54
See id.
55
See, e.g., Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733–35 (1877); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244, 277, 298, 368 (1901); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 332 (1920); United States
v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931); Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor
Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 299 (1941); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 381 (1951)
(Black, J., concurring); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 384 (1962); Byrne v. Karalexis,
396 U.S. 976, 980 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g. Co., 443
U.S. 97, 100 (1979); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 223, 230 (1987);
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 360 (1995); Watchtower Bible & Tract
Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 154, 161–62 (2002).
56
See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857); United States ex rel.
Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 475
(1920); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
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individual human-coder review ensured inclusion of a fuller set of
theoretical and conceptual synonyms referencing the existence of a freedom
of the press.57 Of the more than 5,000 paragraphs discussing the press or
press functions in some way, 1,192 included some reference to the freedom
of the press.
Each instance of usage was further coded for tone. Coders were instructed
to code a reference as neutral if it suggested that a free press or a
constitutional liberty of the press exists, but without any accompanying
commentary characterizing the right. Bare references to “freedom of the
press,” “the liberty of the press,” or “a free press” were coded in this way.
Coders were instructed to code a reference as negative if the paragraph
referencing press freedom suggested that there is no right of press freedom
or if it used language to indicate that the right or liberty is not valuable.
They were instructed to code a reference as positive if it suggested that
press freedom is important or valuable. A reference to “press freedom,”
“free press,” or “liberty of the press” or similar language, along with a
modifier like “vital,” “significant,” “crucial,” “important,” “central,”
“core,” or “essential” received this coding.
The contexts in which these references occur vary widely over the dataset.
Sometimes, press freedom or a “free press” is included in a broader list of
constitutional rights or values;58 in other instances, it is discussed alone
479, 492 (1957); A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v.
Att’y Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 427 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring); Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114, 156, 172 (1973); FCC v. League
of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 366, 384 (1984); Denver Area Educ. Telcomms.
Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 740 (1996); Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316,
320 (2002); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 420 (2010) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
57
See, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 131 (1895) (“liberty of the press”); Downes,
182 U.S. at 282 (“freedom of speech and of the press” (emphasis added)); United States ex
rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 409 (1921) (“free
press”); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664 (1925) (“liberty of speech and of the
press”); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718 (1931) (“the press has exerted a freedom”);
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (“preserve an untrammeled press”).
58 See, e.g., Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 611 (1942) (“freedom of speech, press
and religion”); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 145 (1943) (“free speech, free
press and free assemblage”); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 107 (1943) (“freedom
of speech, press, and religion”). See also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 89 (1966)
(Douglas, J. concurring) (“the freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the
Constitution”); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947) (“the unequivocal command of
the First Amendment serve as constant reminders that freedom of speech and of the press
should not be impaired”); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 284 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (“freedom of speech and of the press are essential to the enlightenment of a free
people and in restraining those who wield power”); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–
02 (1940) (“the freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution”);
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (“the freedom of speech and that of the
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without any reference to other constitutionally protected freedoms.59 In
some instances, this framing was the only characterization of the press that
coders found in the specified paragraphs;60 in others, it was used alongside
other common press frames.61 Post-coding analysis merged all coded
paragraphs with the Supreme Court Database,62 making it possible to parse
the results by Court term, by authoring Justice, and by case topic area. Eight
hundred and sixty-seven of the 1,192 paragraphs referencing freedom of
the press—72.73 percent—appear in cases reaching First Amendment
holdings; the remainder are in cases focused on a variety of other legal
matters.63
III. JUSTICES’ DEPICTIONS OF PRESS FREEDOM
In contrast to the broader set of press references we considered in our larger
study,64 the constitutional right framework focuses specifically on the
Justices’ mentions of press freedom as a First Amendment liberty.
Separately tracking these references allows us to explore important
press”); De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 364 (“freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental
rights”); Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 664 (“the liberty of speech and of the press”); U.S. ex rel.
Turner, 194 U.S. at 294 (“the vital importance of freedom of speech and of the press”).
59
See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 204–05 (1984) (“the liberty of the press”); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1973) (“the constitutional right of a free press”); Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 412 U.S. at 145 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“a free press is indispensable to
a free society”); Craig, 331 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“the freedom of the
press so indispensable to our democratic society”); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 401
(1967) (Black, J., concurring) (“the clearly expressed purpose of the Founders to guarantee
the press a favored spot in our free society”); Craig, 331 U.S. at 383 (Murphy, J., concurring)
(“a free press lies at the heart of our democracy and its preservation is essential to the
survival of liberty”); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 355 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ( “a free press is vital to a democratic society because its freedom gives it
power”); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1931) (“the fundamental
doctrine of freedom of the press”).
60
In 287 of the 1,192 paragraphs containing reference to press freedom, 24.08 percent of
the total references, the Court was referring to the press only through a reference to freedom
of the press.
61
In 526 paragraphs, 44.97 percent of the total, press freedom was referenced alongside
commentary that feel within one of our other codeable frames, like the historical value of
the press, the impact of the press on individuals, the propriety of regulating the press, or the
trustworthiness of the press. In 221 paragraphs, 18.54 percent of the total, it was referenced
alongside two or more of these frames. In 12.42 percent of paragraphs, it was alongside
more than two additional frames.
62
The Supreme Court Database, WASH. U.L., http://scdb.wustl.edu/.
63
For example, 8.31 percent of the references (99 paragraphs) were in cases coded by the
Supreme Court Database as criminal procedure cases; 7.63 percent (91 paragraphs) were in
cases coded as economic activity cases; 3.02 percent (36 paragraphs) were in cases coded
as union cases; and 2.77 percent (33 paragraphs) were in cases coded as civil rights cases.
64
See Jones & West, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Characterizations of the Press, supra note
X.
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questions of when and how members of the Court have reinforced or
amplified the constitutional status of the American free press.
In our examination of this data, we find that throughout the Court’s history,
the constitutional right framework has been a key mechanism employed by
the Justices to signal the continued value of press freedom and the press
function.
A. Unique Framework Reflecting Press Freedom’s Constitutional Status
Our data show that discussing the role of the press as part of our
constitutional system is one of the most frequently used, and therefore
arguably most important, of the press-characterizing contexts we studied.
As shown in Figure 1, it is the third most common framework the Justices
have turned to when mentioning the press, coming in only after basic
depictions of the press in its role as a communicator of information and
discussions of the appropriateness of government regulation of it.
Figure 1.

But beyond the mere frequency, the Justices’ use of the constitutional right
framework also stands out for its unique tonal delivery. By design, every
category in our study was assigned a context in which it would be coded as
positive, negative, or neutral. For most frames, however, their common
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usage tilts heavily toward one tone or another, with some carrying a
predominantly negative tone and others a primarily positive one.65
The first notable tonal characteristic of the Justices’ references to the press
through the press-freedom lens is that these mentions have always been
either positive or neutral in tone. No member of the Court has ever
referenced the right of press freedom with a negative tone—a finding that
cannot be said for any other frame that we studied, including other frames
that skewed heavily positive.66
While the constitutional right context was mostly a neutrally applied
framework, a significant number of the Justices’ references—over 20
percent—were positive characterizations. As discussed earlier, this means
that their reference to the right of press freedom included an explicitly
positive modifier. In some of these positive statements, the Justices
discussed freedom of the press as a standalone constitutional right, referring
to it as “vital,”67 “indispensable,”68 “essential,”69 “fundamental,”70
“important,”71 or “cherished.”72
Often, though, the Justices mentioned press freedom, not in a standalone
way, but in tandem with discussions of other constitutional rights. The
65

See Jones & West, U.S. Supreme Court Characterizations of the Press, supra note X at
__.
66
For example, our “History” frame, which captured every reference the Justices made to
the press through the eyes of the Founders, was nearly always used with a positive tone, but
the dataset includes at least a few references by Justices that are using the framework to
depict the press negatively.
67
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“A free press is
vital to a democratic society”).
68
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (Frankfurter, J, concurring) (“It cannot be repeated
too often that the freedom of the press so indispensable to our democratic society
presupposes an independent judiciary which will, when occasion demands, protect that
freedom.”); CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring
in part) (“Those who wrote our First Amendment put their faith in the proposition that a free
press is indispensable to a free society.”).
69
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (Murphy, J,) (“A free press lies at the heart of our
democracy and its preservation is essential to the survival of liberty.”); Lowe v. SEC, 472
U.S. 181 (1985) (Stevens, J.) (noting the “liberty of the press” and “the vital importance of
protecting this essential liberty.”).
70
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (containing Justice Sutherland’s
reference to “the fundamental doctrine of freedom of the press.”).
71
Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“Important as free speech
and a free press are to a free government and a free citizenry, there is a right even more dear
to many individuals—the right to worship their Maker according to their needs and the
dictates of their souls and to carry their message or their gospel to every living creature.”).
72
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The only issue here is
whether the complete ban on interviews with inmates selected by the press goes beyond
what is necessary for the protection of these interests and infringes upon our cherished right
of a free press.”).
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second Justice John Harlan, for example, referred to the “indispensable
liberties” of “speech, press, or association.”73 Justice Wiley Rutledge
likewise emphasized that “the First Amendment guaranties of the freedoms
of speech, press, assembly and religion occupy preferred position not only
in the Bill of Rights, but also in the repeated decisions of this Court.”74 In
a separate review of these paragraphs, we observed that this practice—of
the Justices including press freedom as one of a select group of significant
constitutional rights—was a significant pattern.
While press freedom appears in the Court’s opinions alongside a variety of
other constitutional rights, we also noted during our post-coding review that
one of its persistent traveling companions was the freedom of speech. The
Justices often linked the two rights and emphasized their centrality to free
people in a democracy. In one illustrative example, Justice Anthony
Kennedy declared that “the freedom of speech and that of the press …
reflect[] the belief of the framers of the Constitution that exercise of the
rights lies at the foundation of free government by free men.”75
The constitutional right framework is also unique because of the inherent
significance that is conveyed by even the Court’s most ordinary uses of it.
Our data show that this framework is a predominantly neutral construct,
with almost 80 percent of the Justices’ mentions of the press in the
constitutional right context occurring without any additional positive
description. The Justices, for example, frequently take note of the simple
inclusion of press freedom in the Constitution—not uncommonly as part of
a straightforward recitation of the First Amendment’s text.76
Such references are technically “neutral” statements, because the Justices
did not include any additional linguistic layer indicating a positive or
negative tone. But the housing of press references within the constitutional
right framework carries, in and of itself, a distinctive weight as compared
to the Court’s other press mentions—because all constitutional rights are,
by definition, legally special.
While there may be ongoing debates about the precise meaning and
contours of the First Amendment right to press freedom, there is no dispute
about its heightened status as compared to the spectrum of human activities
and interests that the Court has not recognized as constitutionally protected.
The Court, for example, does not talk of a “right” to eat, have a job, or
Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461
(1958).
74
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 106 (1949).
75
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (1999).
76
See, e.g., McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675 (2018) (“The First Amendment provides that
‘Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.’”).
73
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receive healthcare—despite the importance of these activities to
individuals. It does not discuss as a categorical constitutional “freedom” the
collective work of teachers, scientists, or farmers—despite the significance
of their occupations to our communities. Indeed, the Court has explicitly
rejected claims of constitutional right status in some areas, such as
physician-assisted suicide,77 access to education,78 protection from private
violence,79 or the testing of DNA evidence by criminal defendants.80 In the
eyes of a subset of legal thinkers, any right that is grounded in explicit
constitutional text—like press freedom—stands on more legitimate
constitutional ground than the rights that are “unenumerated.”81
Additionally, anytime the Justices note press freedom’s incorporation as a
“liberty” through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, they
are implicitly conveying its place among the rights the Court has deemed
to be “fundamental.”82
Therefore, every time the Court places its references to the press or press
function in the constitutional right framework—with or without additional
positive semantics—it is, at a minimum, acknowledging and reinforcing the
press function’s intrinsically heightened legal position. The effect of the
Court noting its constitutional status, is cumulative—each additional
recognition of the First Amendment’s protection of press freedom
contributes to the strengthening of that position. As Frederick Schauer has
explained, in law, “the status of an authority as an authority is the product
of an informal and evolving process by which some sources become

77

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16
(1973).
79
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
80
Dist. Att’y Off. for the Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009).
81
See, e.g., Don Franzen, Reading the Text: An Interview with Justice Antonin Scalia of the
U.S.
Supreme
Court,
L.A.
REV.
BOOKS
(Oct.
1,
2012),
https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/reading-the-text-an-interview-with-justice-antoninscalia-of-the-u-s-supreme-court/ (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia stating, “if you believe it
is a compendium of all unenumerated rights, you have to believe that the framers were nuts.
I mean, did they go through the trouble of listing in detail, you know, the right to trial by
jury in all matters of common law involving more than 20 dollars, no quartering of troops
in homes, or one after another, and finally when you go, “yes, what should we add?
Everything else.” That’s not the way you write a legal document. And this was a legal
document. Just as the Tenth Amendment is nothing but an expression of the belief in
federalism, so also the Ninth Amendment is nothing but an expression of belief in the natural
law. But it is not an invitation to the judges to apply whatever they think the natural law
says.”).
82
Justice John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1299 (1993)
(discussing the importance of the incorporation of First Amendment rights through the term
“liberty.”).
78
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progressively more authoritative as they are increasingly used and
accepted.”83
If a constitutional right’s relevancy is continually reinforced through the
Court’s (even neutral) acknowledgements of its existence, the opposite
phenomenon must also be true: a constitutional right’s power may decline,
not only through explicitly negative references to it, but rather through the
Court’s seeming indifference. A legal principle “that is utterly ignored
cannot be said to be influential or authoritative.”84
B. The Constitutional Right Framework’s Heightened Importance for
Press Freedom
This truism—that a legal right can grow, morph or weaken through the
Court’s repeated acknowledgement of it or, conversely, through judicial
abandonment—is particularly salient for the constitutional right of press
freedom. This is because over the last half century, the Court has treated
freedom of the press as a unique constitutional ingredient—a principle that
adds support to the overall strength of expressive freedoms more generally.
Press freedom’s constitutional potency in this supporting role, moreover,
relies heavily on the Court’s rhetorical signaling of its continued
importance.
The Court’s attention to the constitutional protection for liberty of the press,
as embodied in the First Amendment’s Press Clause, has gone through a
variety of stages throughout the Court’s history. But the key before-andafter dividing line can be drawn at the Court’s incorporation of press
freedom into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in 1931. In
its earliest form, before the end of World War I, the Justices paid little
attention to press freedom, just as they took little notice of any of the First
Amendment’s expressive liberties. That all changed, however, when, in the
1931 case of Near v. Minnesota, they incorporated the protections of the
Press Clause to apply to the states and held, for the first time, that a
government regulation violated the Constitution’s guarantee of the freedom
of the press.85
The Court’s incorporation of press freedom solidified press freedom’s
constitutional standing as a fundamental right of widespread importance.
Consistent with this common understanding of the trajectory of the Court’s
First Amendment jurisprudence, our data show the Justices’ references to
the constitutional right of press freedom spiking in frequency starting in the
1930s. See Figure 2.

83

Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1935 (2008);
Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 309, 347 (2007).
85
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
84
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Figure 2.

While references to press freedom rose significantly post-incorporation,
scholars have noted differences in how the Justices interacted with the right
over time. In the initial period from the 1930s to the 1960s, the Justices
substantively engaged with the First Amendment’s Press Clause.86 During
this era, as David A. Anderson has explained, “the Court invoked the Press
Clause in many cases and appeared to rely on it, rather than the Speech
Clause, to protect freedom of the press.”87
Over time, however, the concept of the constitutional right to a free press
seemed to take on a new role as a backup expressive freedom—one less
likely to be seen as the repository of substantive rights and protections and
more likely to be employed as a rhetorical or analytical tool in support of a
broader First Amendment holding. During this stage, spanning from the
1960s through the early-1990s, the Justices’ interpretation of the freedom
of speech was growing in power and reach. Meanwhile, their depiction of
press freedom was transforming from a constitutional power independent
from or coequal to freedom of speech into a still significant, but less

86

See David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 448 (2002) (referring
to this period as ““the heyday of the Press Clause in the Supreme Court.”).
87
Id.
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distinct, component part of what the Justices began increasingly to refer to
as the “freedom of expression.”88
The First Amendment right to a free press during this time thus assumed
the constitutional character of an often necessary but not sufficient element
that meaningfully informed the shape and breadth of expressive freedom.
The Justices in these years frequently discussed, lauded, and emphasized
press freedom,89 while at the same time rarely relied on it as the
constitutional home of explicit substantive rights. While the Court’s
ultimate holdings in these cases may have been formally grounded in the
Speech Clause, the analyses required to reach those holdings often hinged
on the Justices’ underlying recognition of the Constitution’s protection for
the press.90 The Justices, for example, frequently sandwiched their Speech
Clause holdings between soaring statements about the value of a
constitutionally protected free press.91 Or they analyzed cases through the
real-world effects of their decisions on press liberties and the practical value
of press functions before announcing a right stemming ostensibly from the
freedom of speech.92 Indeed, despite the decline in substantive Press Clause
holdings, it is during this later period that the Court handed down a large
number of its most well-known decisions recognizing and protecting the
press function.93
Take, as an example, the Court’s 1976 decision in Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart.94 While the legal challenge was brought by a news
organization, this case considered a trial judge’s order that prohibited
“everyone in attendance” at a criminal pretrial hearing from publicly
disseminating potentially prejudicial evidence and testimony. The Court
ultimately concluded that the order was an unconstitutional prior restraint
on speech—a holding that applies broadly to all speakers. Yet
See Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then and Now, 77 OHIO STATE L.J. 100 (noting that
“[t]he term ‘freedom of expression’ first appears in 1921 and then reappears in hundreds of
cases over the next almost century.”).
89
See RonNell Andersen Jones, The Dangers of Press Clause Dicta, 48 GA. L. REV. 705,
715 (2014) (noting that “[a]ttorneys and scholars are left with isolated accolades and bold
statements of the function and value of the press that look and feel significant … but by
definition are not.”).
90
See Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA. L. REV. 729 (2014).
91
See RonNell Andersen Jones, The Dangers of Press Clause Dicta, 48 GA. L. REV. 705
(2014).
92
See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
93
See RonNell Andersen Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press and Why It
Matters, 66 ALA. L. REV. 253, 255–256 (2014) (“In a smattering of pre-Sullivan cases and
then very consistently throughout a period that we might call the press ‘Glory Days’ of the
1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, the Court went out of its way to speak of the press and then
offered effusively complimentary depictions of the media in its opinions.”).
94
427 U.S. 539 (1976).
88
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contemplation of press freedom is so interwoven into the Court’s analysis,
it is difficult to identify where the line shifts from press freedom to speech
rights. The Court begins its opinion, for example, by stating that question
presented in the case was whether the order violated “the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of the press.” Throughout the opinion, however, the
Court situates the case as involving the First Amendment protection against
prior restraints on “speech”95 alone before ultimately landing on a holding
based in more ambiguously worded violations of “the freedom to speak and
publish”96 and “the guarantees of freedom of expression.”97
The Court’s views on the distinction between freedom of speech and
freedom of the press in Nebraska Press Association are decidedly blurry,
as are the particulars of what either phrase exactly means. Yet the opinion
nonetheless makes clear that the Justices appreciate the underlying
importance of a constitutionally protected free press. The most significant
way the Court conveys this appreciation is through its simple and consistent
mentioning of the constitutional right. 98 Between the Court’s majority
opinion and the four concurring opinions in that case, the Justices make
only seven references combined to “free speech” or the “freedom,”
“liberty,” or “right” of speech, yet they make nineteen such references to
the constitutional right of press freedom.99
Again, our data reflect this understanding of the Justices’ evolving
relationship to press freedom during the last few decades of the twentieth
century. While they may have been increasingly relying on the Speech
Clause to support their opinions’ bottom-line conclusions, the Justices were
still openly relying on principles of press freedom to inform their

See, e.g., id. at 556 (discussing precedent dealing with regulations that “impose a
‘previous’ or ‘prior’ restraint on speech”); id. at 559 (noting the concern that prior restraints
can chill or freeze “speech.”); id. at 562 (posing the question of whether the defendant’s
right to a fair trial “justifies such invasion of free speech”).
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
See, e.g., id. at 548 (quoting John Jay on the danger to liberty of limiting the freedom of
the press); id. at 549 (referencing the balancing between “the right to a fair trial and the
rights of a free press”); see id. at 556 (quoting the text of the First Amendment); id. at 557
(noting the right to freedom of the press); id. at 561 (noting the “the right of the press”
against prior restraint).
99
These numbers were tabulated following the guidelines of our codebook for identifying
the constitutional right frame. Thus, they exclude references that are part of book titles or
case names, as well as references that appear in a footnote or appendix, and include
references that appear in the opinions as a quotation from another source.
95
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thinking.100 Thus, our data show the Justices’ use of the constitutional right
framework remained robust through the beginning of the 1990s.
Overall, the Court’s post-incorporation treatment of press freedom is
consistent with our findings on the peak period of the constitutional right
framework, which runs from roughly 1935 to 1990. Whether as a matter of
cause or effect, our data also show that the Justices who most commonly
employed this framework served on the Court between these years. Of the
six Justices who most often discussed the constitutional right of press
freedom, five of them—Justice Hugo Black, Justice William Douglas,
Justice William Brennan, Chief Justice Warren Burger, and Justice Stanley
Reed—served the entirety of their terms on the Court during these
decades.101 The other Justice in this group—Justice Byron White, who was
the fourth most frequent user of this framework—served more than 90
percent (or twenty-eight of his thirty-one years) during this crucial
period.102 The importance of the constitutional right framework for these
Justices is likewise reflected in the percentage of their overall press
references that employed this frame. It was Justices Black and Reed’s most
commonly used frame and Justice Douglas’s second most frequently used
frame. Our tracking of the Court’s positive references to the liberty of the
press also peaks during this time period. Although these fifty-five years
constitute less than 25 percent of the 235-year history of the Court, 82
percent of the total number of positive constitutional right references are
found during this time.
The next chapter of press freedom at the Court generally correlates with the
Roberts Court years, which began in 2005 and continues to the present.
During this period, the Roberts Court gained a reputation among many as
an exceedingly pro-First Amendment Court.103 According to Joel Gora, the
Roberts Court “may well have been the most speech-protective Court in a

100

See Anderson, supra note ??, at 430 n. 3 (noting that even the Justices themselves
sometimes confused a substantive speech right held by all speakers with a constitutional
protection emanating from the Press Clause.).
101
Black 169 (1937-1971) 34 / 34 years = 100 percent
Douglas 129 (1939-1975) 36 / 36 years = 100 percent
Brennan 102 (1956-1990) 34 / 34 years = 100 percent
Burger 50 (1969-1986) 17 / 17 years = 100 percent
Reed 48 (1938 – 1957) 19 / 19 years = 100 percent
102
White 52 (1962-1993) 28 / 31 years = 90.3 percent. The other Justices in the top ten users
of the Right Frame are Sutherland 37 (1922-1938) 3 / 16 = .19 percent
Frankfurter 37 (bottom left quadrant) (1929-1962) 27 / 27 years = 100 percent
Stewart 36 (Or of the Press) (1958-1981) 23 / 23years = 100 percent
Stevens 35 (1975-2010) 15 / 35 years = .43 percent
103
See infra Part V.B.3.
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generation, if not in our history.”104 Gregory Magarian likewise has
observed that “[f]ree speech advocates’ conventional (not to say universal)
view of this Court is adoring.”105 Indeed, First Amendment expansionism
seems to be a guiding principle to Chief Justice Robert personally. He has
called himself, “the most aggressive defender of the First Amendment”106
on the Court and frequently authors opinions in cases involving expressive
rights. In the words of Ronald Collins and David Hudson, “Roberts is quite
at home in the house of the First Amendment—it is perhaps his favorite
jurisprudential dwelling.”107
As explored in the next section, however, the Roberts Court’s broad
embrace of First Amendment values in some areas has not been extended
to the constitutional right of press freedom.
IV. THE DISAPPEARING “FREEDOM OF THE PRESS”
The principle of freedom of the press—once ubiquitous in the Court’s
constitutional-rights commentary—is now rare. The data show only scant
acknowledgement of the concept from the Roberts Court. Even bare,
neutral references to the idea are now few and far between. This stark
abandonment of the Court’s reference to press freedom stands out as
particularly glaring even when situated within the wider trends of an overall
decreased quantity of Supreme Court references to the press. On top of this,
the data associated with Justices who currently sit on the Court show no
frequent invokers of the concept, with the Roberts Court Justices as true
historical outliers on this front.
This Part explores the study’s data on the disappearance of “freedom of the
press” on several fronts: (A) in the decline of the raw total instances of
reference to freedom of the press over time; (B) in the decline of the
percentage of the times when the Court is speaking of the press that it is
104

Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First Amendment, 25 J.L.
& POL'Y 63, 64 (2016).
105
Gregory P. Magarian, The Marrow of Tradition: The Roberts Court and Categorical
First Amendment Speech Exclusions, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339, 1340 (2015); see also
id. (quoting Burt Neuborne calling the Roberts Court “the strongest First Amendment court
in history” and Kenneth Star saying it is “the most free speech Court in American history.”);
but see Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 724 (2011)
(noting “the Roberts Court’s dismal record of protecting free speech in cases involving
challenges to the institutional authority of the government when it is regulating the speech
of its employees, its students, and its prisoners, and when it is claiming national security
justifications.”).
106
April Hefner, Honorable John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice of the United States, Speaks
at Belmont University, BELMONT U. (Feb. 7, 2019), https://news.belmont.edu/honorablejohn-g-roberts-jr-chief-justice-of-the-united-states-speaks-at-belmont-university/.
107
Ronald Collins & David Hudson, John Roberts: Mr. First Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG
(July 21, 2020), (https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/07/john-roberts-mr-first-amendment/.
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invoking any notion of freedom of the press; (C) in the lower frequency of
reference to a “freedom of the press” framework in recent Court Terms as
compared to that frame’s overall frequency in the full historical dataset; and
(D) in the linguistic patterns of Justices on the current Court, as compared
to those of their predecessors. On every axis, the data show that
acknowledgement of the right is on the decline.
A. Declining frequency of reference to freedom of the press
The disappearance of press freedom is clear in our raw numerical data
tracking the total numbers of times the concept is articulated by the Justices
of the Court. As seen in Figure 3, the number of incidents of reference to
freedom of the press by Justices has plummeted in the last generation.
Figure 3.

As might be expected, Supreme Court references to press freedom were
scant before the incorporation of the First Amendment108 and the initial
recognition of a substantive press freedom in Near v. Minnesota in 1931.109
But once the right was recognized, it was steadily acknowledged for much
of the next half century. In the period from the 1930s to the 1990s, even at
its lowest frequency points, the Court was quite routinely mentioning press
108

See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 653 (1925) (holding that the 14th Amendment
extended the First Amendment’s protections to apply to state governments).
109
283 U.S. 697 (1931) (striking a prior restraint against a newspaper as an unconstitutional
restriction on the First Amendment’s freedoms of speech and press).
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freedom.110 That is, for most of the modern newsgathering and journalistic
era, the Supreme Court’s consistent acknowledgement of a constitutional
right of freedom of the press was a given.
At some moments in history, the references to the right have been especially
strong. The raw frequency data has a bimodal peak, with an uptick in 194044 that is sandwiched by two somewhat lower-frequency eras and followed
by a second especially strong high point in the five-year period from 197074,111 during which the Court made reference to the concept a total of 179
times. At the historical heights of its frequency, the concept of freedom of
the press was sometimes being invoked more than fifty times in a single
term.112
In contrast, in four of the last ten terms, there have been zero references to
the concept of press freedom in any majority, concurring, or dissenting
opinion or other published work of the Justices appearing in the U.S.
Reports. In three additional terms in this time period, there was only a single
mention of the concept.113 Indeed, except for one clear outlier term,114 no
term of the Roberts Court era has included even double-digit mentions of
press freedom by all nine Justices combined, across the entire term.115
Eighty-seven percent of all terms in the Roberts Court era had three or
fewer mentions of the right of any variety. The last positive references to
freedom of the press were more than a decade ago.116

110

Terms with 30 or more references were once relatively common. The dataset shows 38
in 1972, 35 in 1971, 45 in 1970, 36 in 1966, 31 in 1963, 30 in 1956, 33 in 1945, 41 in 1942,
and 33 in 1939.
111
Although, as discussed in more detail below, press-focused cases are not solely
responsible for this uptick, this time period did give rise to some of the most foundational
constitutional cases featuring journalists and media entities as parties. See, e.g., Miami
Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 406 U.S. 665 (1972); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
112
In both the 1941 Term and the 1973 Term, there were 53 separate paragraphs referencing
the freedom of the press. In the 1960 Term, there were 52.
113
There were no references to press freedom in the 2017, 2015, 2014, or 2012 Terms.
114
October Term 2009 had 11 total references.
115
There were six references in 2018; three each 2005, 2007, and 2019; two in 2006; and
one each in 2011, 2013, and 2016. In 2008, 2012, 2014, 2015, and 2017, there were none at
all.
116
See Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, __ (2010) (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (“the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press,
like the First Amendment's command, do not vary”)); Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564
U.S. 379 (2010) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530(1945) (“It was not by
accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a
single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress
of grievances”)).
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Thus, in a simple assessment of frequency, we see that a concept that once
lived vibrantly within the Supreme Court’s constitutional rights
commentary has largely exited the lexicon. The Court once made regular
reference to this freedom, and now it does not.
B. Declining percentage of times freedom of the press is mentioned
when the Court is referencing the press
The disappearance of the press-freedom right is also seen in more complex
analyses of the press-related trends at the highest Court. Notably, the fading
of the concept of freedom of the press is evident in the data on the relative
frequency of this framing within the fuller set of paragraphs that reference
the press at all. That is, there has not just been a decline in the overall
number of times each term that the Court mentions freedom of the press;
there has also been a decline in the percentage of times when the Court is
speaking of the press that it is invoking a notion of press freedom.
Our wider project captured every time the Court mentioned the press or the
press function in any way,117 with an inclusiveness designed to capture the
Court’s identification of those functions in changing terminology over
time.118 Once a paragraph was included in the dataset, coders searched it
for a variety of common frames, including the “freedom of the press”
frame. Our investigation of the references to the constitutional right of
freedom of the press in contrast to other references to the press reveals
additional powerful evidence that this right is disappearing.
During the long post-incorporation period of frequent “freedom of the
press” usage, it was consistently the case that 20 percent or more of all press
mentions made by any Justice in any context were references to freedom of
the press.
The strong position that the constitutional right of press freedom occupied
in the Court’s overall dialogue about press functions is illustrated in Table
A, which provides a summary of the percent of total references to the press
that contained the concept of freedom of the press in each of the five-year
periods from 1935 to 1974.
Table A

117

See RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, U.S. Supreme Court Characterizations
of the Press: An Empirical Study, 100 N. CAROLINA L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2022).
118
See, infra, Part II.
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Year range

Percent of total references to the
press containing the concept of
freedom of the press

1935-39

29.7%

1940-44

29.2%

1945-49

22.1%

1950-54

19.1 %

1955-59

27.4%

1960-64

26.4%

1965-69

18.6%

1970-74

13.1%

In several individual terms at the peak of its usage, the frame constituted an
even larger percentage of the total press references, with the Justices
referencing the freedom of the press more than four in every ten times they
spoke of the press.119 When we review the data throughout the 1930s,120
40s,121 50s,122 and 60s,123 we routinely find terms in which 20 to 50 percent
of the press references are making at least some nod to the constitutional
right to a free press.
When this same analysis is conducted on the data from more recent terms,
the drop-off in references to the right of freedom of the press is stark. Table
B, which reports the snapshot summary of the percent of total references to
the press that contained the concept of freedom of the press in the five-year
periods from 1995 to 2019, shows that at no point in the more recent era
has the percentage exceeded ten percent.

119

1933 (50 percent of all press references referred to freedom of the press); 1959 (48.6
percent); 1937 (45 percent); 1942 (44.6 percent); 1943 (44.1 percent); 1939 (44.8 percent).
120
1933 (50 percent); 1937 (45 percent); 1939 (41.2 percent); 1935 (26.1 percent); 1932 (32
percent).
121
1942 (44.6 percent); 1943 (44.1 percent); 1949 (38 percent); 1941 (36.8 percent); 1948
(33.3 percent); 1940 (31 percent); 1947 (23 percent).
122
1959 (48.7 percent); 1953 (35.3 percent); 1956 (33.3 percent); 1950 (28.1 percent); 1957
(26.3 percent).
123
1960 (35.1 percent); 1967 (34.6 percent); 1962 (26.3 percent); 1963 (25.6 percent); 1968
(23.5 percent); 1966 (20.5 percent).
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Table B

Term range

Percent of total references to the
press containing the concept of
freedom of the press

1995-99

4.1%

2000-04

10.8%

2005-09

7.6%

2010-14

5.5%

2015-19

10.2%

The Court is referencing the press less often overall in recent years,124 but
the data indicate that, even within this smaller set of total press references,
the percentage of references that suggest the existence of a constitutional
right of press freedom is drastically declining. In five separate terms of the
Roberts Court, the Justices made some references to the press but never
once did so using a “freedom of the press” framing.125 In most other
Roberts-era terms, press freedom hovers in the range of only 5 to 9 percent
of the total press references.126
Within the already diminishing total group of press references, the
“freedom of the press” frame is being eclipsed by other frames. Notably,
the Court’s references are shifting heavily to the frame that we call the
“Communication” frame, which captures instances in which the Court
simply acknowledges an act of journalism or the fact that the media was
used to make something publicly known. These bare references to the
communication function of the press constituted, on average, about a fifth
of the mentions of the press in the years between 1935 and 1974. During
the Roberts Court era, they average nearly half of all mentions. In eight of
the last fifteen years, more than 50 percent of all mentions were simply
saying that the media exists or that news was published.

124

See RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, U.S. Supreme Court Characterizations
of the Press: An Empirical Study, 100 N. CAROLINA L. REV. 110 (forthcoming 2022).
125
The “freedom of the press” frame constituted 0 percent of the overall coding total in the
years 2008, 2012, 2014, 2015, and 2017.
126
2016 (6.7 percent); 2013 (5 percent); 2011 (9.1 percent); 2010 (7.7 percent); 2009 (7.2
percent); 2006 (9.1 percent); 2005 (7.9 percent). No individual term in the Roberts Court
era exceeded 15 percent press-freedom references. There were 15 percent in 2007 and 12
percent in both 2018 and 2019.
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The combined data shows that in the past, when the topic of the press or
press functions came up, the Court was quite routinely taking the
opportunity to speak of the freedom of the press. To the extent that the
topics come up today, the Court is more often simply noting that the press
function occurs, omitting the constitutional right from the mention. The
framing of the press function as something that is rights-bearing or housed
within a constitutional freedom is disappearing.
C. Underperformance of the frame from its overall expected
frequency
The modern-era disappearance of press freedom is further confirmed by
more detailed quantitative analysis of the “freedom of the press” frame’s
performance against its own likelihood in the full dataset.
Using our full historical data and the total sets of references to the press
within every framing, we set out to investigate how many references to the
press might ordinarily be expected and to judge the modern data against
this baseline. The analysis confirms that references to the constitutional
right of press freedom are seriously underrepresented in the Roberts Court
era.
A z-score, or standard score, is a measure of how many standard deviations
below or above the population mean a raw score is. It is a mechanism for
comparing results to a so-called “normal” population. Here, our “normal”
is the incidence of the constitutional right framing that we would expect
over all time, given the full set of data. Thus, the z-score reveals how much
the press-freedom frame is over- or under-performing its “normal” at any
given time period. By creating z-scores for each frame’s number of
references, we are able to directly compare just how discrepant any period
is for the incidence of the particular frame.
We examined the extent to which each frame in every half-decade period
was above or below the average for that frame across all of the half-decade
periods studied. Figure 4 shows these z-score results for references to
freedom of the press. In the bar plot, positive values on the y-axis indicate
that the count for the frame in that half-decade period are above average by
the listed standard deviations, relative to the frame’s overall quantity in the
data. Negative values indicate that the count for the frame in that halfdecade period are below average.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036592

32

THE DISAPPEARING FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
DRAFT (February 2022) DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION

Figure 4.

The z-score analysis, quite expectedly, shows freedom of the press
references turning to stronger relative activity from the early- to mid-1930s
onward, once the Court incorporated the First Amendment and
acknowledged modern press freedom in Near. The over-performance of the
frame based on its z-score peaks abruptly in the 1970s but then sharply
declines, with freedom of the press essentially collapsing as a concept by
the mid-1990s.
This analysis of the underperformance of the press-freedom frame from its
overall expected frequency is further confirmed through an additional
model that more squarely compares the Justices’ usage patterns in different
eras. We conducted an investigation of the underlying press-freedomreference trends127 from a baseline era of 1935-74. We then applied those
identical trends to predict what the expected reference numbers would be
in a later era, from 1995-2019. Figure __, showing the resulting
discrepancies, demonstrates a clear behavioral shift in the Justices’
127 The baseline era trends were established by tallying the average number of mentions

made to each case in each of the broad Supreme Court Database issue areas, which could
then be applied to the mixture of cases the Court decided in the second, compared era.
Because this approach calculates the average number of references per case in each of the
issue areas, it can be employed even if the length of the two eras is different.
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willingness to refer to press freedom. Had the tendencies of the 1935-74
Justices been in play from 1995-2019, we would expect to see almost 278
references to the notion of a constitutional right of freedom of the press. In
actuality, we see just 64, which is only 23 percent of the expected value.
Moreover, as also depicted in Figure ___, this discrepancy is greater in the
constitutional right frame than it is in any other studied frame. When the
same data is more closely analyzed within tonal categories, the number of
expected references falls short for both positive and neutral mentions.
Neutral references in the compared era were 25 percent of the expected total
under the baseline-era trends. Positive references were just 16 percent of
the expected total. Thus, while both varieties of reference to press freedom
have collapsed since the baseline era, positive references have collapsed the
most.

Figure __.

Thus, even when compared with its own expected frequency and
controlling for an overall declining number of total references to the press,
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the Court’s invocation of “freedom of the press” as a concept is in stark
decline at the U.S. Supreme Court.
D. Freedom of the Press and the Justices of the Court
Finally, the disappearance of freedom of the press is evident in comparisons
of the press-freedom patterns of the Justices on the current Court in contrast
to their predecessors. Both our quantitative data and our observations of the
contextual clues within these patterns show that there has been a massive
institutional shift in the Justices’ collective approach to press freedom, of a
degree not seen since the First Amendment’s incorporation. The shift is
from a Court-wide acknowledgement of the constitutional right to an
almost uniform abandonment of it. A close investigation of the usage by all
of the individual Justices in the dataset reveals that, in contrast to Justices
of previous eras, most of the current Justices have rarely, if ever, mentioned
press freedom in any context—and that there appear to be no true advocates
of the right on the current Court.
The Justices with the highest frequency of mentions of the constitutional
right of press freedom all sat on the Court during the post-incorporation
eras of the 1930s through the 1990s.128 At the top of this list are Justices
who referred to the concept more than one hundred separate times, 129 the
last of whom, Justice Brennan, left the Court in 1990.130 No recent Justice
has referred to the concept of press freedom with anything close to that
frequency. By way of illustration of the more global shift that seems to have
occurred, Justice Clarence Thomas, the highest scoring “press freedom”
invoker on the current Court, has fewer total references to the concept in
nearly three decades on the bench than Justice Black had in just the period
from 1940 to 1942.131
Even more telling than snapshots of the behaviors of individual Justices,
though, is the more global data showing a clear change in the likelihood of
acknowledgement of freedom of the press across the board. Several
separate analyses of the data make clear that the overall numbers of pressfreedom references in the earlier post-incorporation eras were not a

128

See infra Part ___.
Justice Hugo Black did so 169 times. Justice William O. Douglas did so 129 times.
Justice William Brennan did so 102 times.
130
Justice William Brennan retired in 1990. Justices Black and Douglas left the Court in
1971 and 1975, respectively.
131
Justice Thomas has made 28 total references to freedom of the press. Justice Black made
31 references between 1940 and 1942 (5 in October Term 1940, 19 in October Term 1941,
and 7 in October Term 1942).
129
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function of any particular Justice’s frequency of use, but instead of a more
consistent, Court-wide recognition of the right that has now disappeared.
Notably, in the terms in the dataset in which the numbers of references to
the constitutional right of freedom of the press are particularly high, the
mentions did not come from a small number of especially press-praising
Justices. Rather, Justices who varied in ideology, background, and
friendliness toward the press appear to have shared a common, baseline
assumption that the constitutional right of press freedom exists. An
illuminating illustration is seen in the data of Justice Byron White. As a
matter of overall tone, Justice White was the least press-friendly Justice of
all time,132 yet he nevertheless made more than fifty separate references to
the concept of freedom of the press133—more than 50 percent more
mentions per term than the Roberts Court’s most frequent press-freedom
referencer.134 Justice White routinely went on to find that the values at stake
in the individual case outweighed press freedom or that protection was not
warranted in the particular circumstances, but he nonetheless consistently
acknowledged the existence and relevancy of the right.
In an effort to further explore Court-wide behavior, we calculated the pressfreedom career averages of every Justice across time, investigating the
average number of mentions per term made by each of the Justices who sat
on the Court in particular eras. What we again find is that, across the board,
the Justices of the Court once made far more frequent reference to the
principle of freedom of the press than today’s Justices do. So, for example,
Figure 5 contrasts the full-career patterns of the nine Justices who sat on
the Court in 1964, the year in which New York Times v. Sullivan was
decided, with the records of the nine Justices who were sitting on the Court
when our study concluded in July 2020. The 1964 Court’s Justices were
speaking of press freedom with some regularity—not just in Sullivan or in
the term in which Sullivan was decided, but across their often very long
careers on the bench.135 Only one Justice on the 1964 Court, Justice Tom
Clark,136 had a career-long average of less than one press-freedom
132

See RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, U.S. Supreme Court Characterizations
of the Press: An Empirical Study, 100 N. CAROLINA L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2022).
133
Justice White authored 52 total paragraphs that were coded as containing references to
press freedom.
134
Justice White was on the Court for thirty-one years, and averaged 1.7 references per term.
The highest averaging current Justice is Justice Clarence Thomas, with .97 references per
term.
135 These nine Justices include Justices Black (career average of 5 references per term);
Goldberg (4 per term); Douglas (3.4 per term); Brennan (1.9 per term); Warren (1.9 per
term); Stewart (1.6 per term); White (1.6 per term); and Harlan (1.5 per term).
136 Justice Clark, who served on the Court from 1948 to 1967, had a career average of .83
references per term.
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reference per term, and even he authored fifteen total mentions of the
concept in his eighteen years as a Justice. Conversely, there is no Justice on
the 2020 Court with a career average of even one press-freedom mention
per term.137 Eight of the nine Justices of the current Court have an average
of less than one press-freedom mention for every three terms on the Court,
and three of them have no mentions at all.138 The career per-term average
of Justice Clark, the lowest scorer of the earlier era, was at least three times
larger than the per-term averages of every Justice on the current Court
except Justice Thomas.
Figure 5.

Average per-term references to freedom of the press over the Justice’s entire career, for
Justices who sat on the Court in the 1963 Term and those who sat on the Court in the 2019
Term.

Indeed, the data indicate near uniformity of recognition of the right for most
of the Court’s earlier post-incorporation eras. The distribution of references
across Justices in this era was broad. For example, in October Term 1960
137

As of July 2020, Justice Clarence Thomas had made 28 press-freedom references in his
nearly 29 years on the Court, for a career average of .97 references per term.
138
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito both had an average of .27 mentions
per term. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg had an average of .15 mentions per term. Justice
Stephen Breyer had an average of .11 mentions per term. Justice Elena Kagan had an average
of .10 mentions per term. Justices Brett Kavanaugh, Neil Gorsuch, and Sonia Sotomayor
had never mentioned freedom of the press.
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and again in October Term 1973, there were more than fifty total references
to freedom of the press over the course of the term. These mentions did not
come at the hands of a few press-freedom activists; instead, the data show
seven of the nine Justices on the Court contributing references.139 This
same breadth of acknowledgement—with a far-reaching distribution of
mentions across much of the full Court—was true of every other especially
high-frequency term during the pre-Roberts Court period.140 There was
near uniformity of voice amongst the Justices in a steady acknowledgement
of a free-press right.
The data show the tide has now turned at the Court. Whereas, for much of
the pre-Roberts Court era, the shared foundational baseline was one of
recognition of the right to freedom of the press, there is now homogeneity
in taking no notice of it. Positive, praising references to the right of press
freedom have all but vanished,141 and it is now not out of the ordinary for
entire terms to pass without a single Justice so much as gesturing toward
the existence of the right. While it was once the case that nearly all of the
Justices might mention the right in a given term, it is now more regularly
the case that almost none of them do so. In five of the fifteen terms since
John Roberts became Chief Justice, no Justices at all have invoked the
concept.142 In three of those fifteen terms, only a single Justice has done
so.143

139

The 52 references in October Term 1960 included 18 from Justice Hugo Black, 16 from
Chief Justice Earl Warren, eight from Justice William O. Douglas, five from Justice William
Brennan, three from Justice Tom C. Clark, and one each from Justices Potter Stewart and
John Marshall Harlan II. The 53 references in October Term 1973 included 15 from Justice
William O. Douglas, 12 from Justice Lewis Powell, seven each from Justices Potter Stewart
and Byron White, six from Justice William O. Brennan, five from Chief Justice Warren
Burger, and one from Justice William Rehnquist.
140
In 1941, there were 53 references, with references made by six of the nine Justices. In
1970, there were 45 references, with references made by seven of the nine Justices. In 1942,
there were 41 references, with references made by eight of the nine Justices.
141
The last positively toned references to freedom of the press by any Justice were more
than a decade ago. Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (quoting Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)) (“[T]he basic principles of freedom of
speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary.”); Borough of
Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 388 (2011) (quoting Thomas , 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945) (“It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press
were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and
to petition for redress of grievances.”)). In the entire Roberts Court era, there have been only
four such references.
142
In four of the last ten Terms—2017, 2015, 2014, 2012—there have been no references
to freedom of the press of any sort by any Justice in any material published in the U.S.
Reports.
143
In five other terms, only two Justices referenced the right.
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The combined total number of times that every Justice who was sitting on
the Court in June 2020 has invoked the right of press freedom in their entire
collective years on the Court is only forty-six. This is fewer references than
appeared in a single term at several points in the earlier eras144 and fewer
references than were made in just a handful of particularly active terms by
Justice Hugo Black, the most-frequent earlier Justice.145
A more direct statistical comparison with the other Justices throughout
history confirms the extent to which the Roberts Court Justices are clear
outliers on this principle. We compared this group of nine Justices to other
Justices to determine whether the 46 total mentions made by this group is
aberrationally low. The nine Justices sitting on the Court in July 2020 who
had generated the total of forty-six references had served a cumulative total
of 140 Terms on the Court. Over the entire history of the Court, there have
been a total of 1,986 Terms of Justice service.146 In an effort to determine
how discrepant that July 2020 group is compared to other slates of JusticeTerm combinations, we randomly selected 140 of those 1,986 Justice-Term
observations to count the number of references to freedom of the press
within the random subset, and then repeated the process for a total of 25,000
investigations. The results, depicted in Figure 6, indicate that the Roberts
Court Justices are, in fact, making far fewer references to freedom of the
press as a group on a per-term basis.147 A remarkable 97 percent of the
randomly selected sample sets yielded more press-freedom references than
the Roberts Court Justices. This random sampling drew upon the full slate
of Justice-Term combinations—including those that occurred before the
First Amendment was incorporated, before the existence of the modern
press, and before any press references occurred at the Court—and yet the
Roberts Court Justices’ collective mentions of freedom of the press still
pale in comparison.

144 In October Term 1941, there were 53 total references to freedom of the press. In October

Term 1960, there were 52 total references. In 1973, there were 53 total references.
145
Justice Hugo Black’s highest terms of usage were 1941 (19 references), 1960 (18
references), 1945 (16 references), and 1970 (12 references). In just these four terms, he
amassed more mentions of the constitutional right of freedom of the press than all nine
Justices of the current Court have ever made.
146
This formula gives term credit to any Justice who cast at least one vote during a term.
147
The median number of references is 82, with 25th and 75th percentile values of 68 and
98, respectively.
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Figure 6.

An analysis of the individual current Justices’ references to press freedom
confirms the scope and magnitude of this institutional shift. At the time our
study concluded in June of 2020, eight of the nine Justices serving that term
had never positively referenced press freedom in all their time on the
Court.148 Three of the nine Justices on the Court had not made a single
reference of any variety to the concept of freedom of the press in any
published Supreme Court document. Two of the Justices with zero
mentions—Gorsuch and Kavanaugh—were newcomers with a shared total
of only five years on the Court at the time our study concluded.149 But one
of these Justices, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, had been on the Court for eleven
years. It is not the case that Justice Sotomayor had lacked for opportunity;
by that date, she had written fifteen opinions in cases that the Supreme
148

The only currently sitting Justice to do so is Justice Clarence Thomas, although none of
his positive references were in a context involving the application of the freedom to a
journalist or a news organization.
149 Gorsuch joined the Court on April 7, 2017 and had been a Justice for 3 years at the time
this study concluded in July 2020. Adam Liptak and Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch
Confirmed by Senate as Supreme Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html.
Kavanaugh joined the Court on October 6, 2018 and had been a Justice for 2 years. Brett
Kavanaugh Confirmation: Victory for Trump in Supreme Court Battle, BBC (Oct. 7, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45774174.
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Court Database classifies as being within the First Amendment issue area
and had mentioned some aspect of the press or the press function 68
different times. Indeed, with an average of more than six such mentions per
term, she outpaced every other currently sitting Justice in her frequency of
general press mentions. Yet she has never noted even the conceptual
existence of freedom of the press.150
Five of the remaining six Justices on the Court at the conclusion of our
study had referenced press freedom with only single-digit frequency in their
entire careers, despite all having been on the Court for more than a decade.
This group includes Justice Samuel Alito,151 who has publicly criticized
some members of the press,152 but also includes Justice Elena Kagan, the
Justice with the strongest First Amendment background before joining the
Court.153 Prior to her confirmation to the Court, Justice Kagan had “worked
on free-speech and free-press issues more than any recent high court
nominee.”154 Despite this history, she has been surprisingly silent in the
recognition of freedom of the press during her decade on the Court, with
only a single mention of the principle.155 Also in this group were two of the
In the full set of Justice Sotomayor’s overall press references, she used a press-positive
tone only 11.8 percent of the time, see RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, U.S.
Supreme Court Characterizations of the Press: An Empirical Study, 100 N. CAROLINA L.
REV. ___ (forthcoming 2022), so the wider body of her jurisprudence likewise shows no
signals of press friendliness.
151
Justice Alito had referenced freedom of the press just four times in nearly 15 years on
the Court, for a career-to-date average of .27 references per term. None of his references
were positive in tone.
152
See Ed O’Keefe, Samuel Alito v. The Press, CNN (Nov. 18, 2014),
https://www.cnn.com/2014/11/17/politics/alito-talks-about-the-press (quoting Alito as
suggesting that, while the full-time press corps covering the Court is largely competent,
some news columnists are “not very knowledgeable”).
153 See generally Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality:
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion,
1992 SUP. CT. REV. 29 (1992); Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography
After R.A.V., 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 873 (1993); Elena Kagan, When a Speech Code Is a Speech
Code: The Stanford Policy and the Theory of Incidental Restraints, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
957 (1996); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996).
154
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Elena Kagan, 34 NEWS MEDIA & L. 25, 25
(2010).
155 Justice Kagan has alluded to the concept of freedom of the press only once, and not with
any positive tonal overlay, merely noting it once in passing in a challenge to a campaign
finance regulation that the Court had previously held that “the central purpose of the Speech
and Press Clauses … was to assure a society in which ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’
public debate concerning matters of public interest would thrive.” Arizona Free Ent. Club's
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 767–68 (2011) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 93, n. 127 (1976) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964))).
150
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Court’s then-longest-serving members, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg156 and
Justice Stephen Breyer,157 who had each been on the Court more than a
quarter of a century but had made only four and three total references to
freedom of the press, respectively.
Chief Justice John Roberts himself has done almost nothing to keep a
constitutional right of freedom of the press conceptually alive during his
time as Chief. In his fifteen years at the Court, Roberts alluded to freedom
of the press or a free press only four times and never once referenced the
right with a positive connotation. One early reference from Roberts pointed
to a past Court’s apparent application of the right.158 The other references
were all noting the right of freedom of the press in the course of dismissing
its applicability. On two separate occasions—representing 50 percent of his
total career mentions—Roberts referenced freedom of the press only to say
that “it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press
to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part
carried out by means of language.”159 On another occasion, he asserted that
“it rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and
press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of
conduct in a violation of a valid criminal statute.”160
Justice Clarence Thomas’s press references reveal a similar pattern.
Quantitatively, Justice Thomas comes out as the clear leader in the
156

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, whose final year on the Court was the last year included in
the dataset, had been on the Court for 27 years but had referenced freedom of the press only
four total times—all in neutral, rather than positive, ways. One of Justice Ginsberg’s four
references to freedom of the press is merely a quote of an earlier opinion noting “[a]
contention cannot be seriously considered which assumes that freedom of the press includes
a right to raise money to promote circulation by deception of the public.” Illinois, ex rel.
Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003) (quoting Donaldson v.
Read Mag., 333 U.S. 178, 192 (1948)).
157

None of Justice Breyer’s references invokes the concept in a way that leads to the
protection of newsgathering or broader press functions. One of his three mentions of press
freedom notes “the Constitution’s general command that ‘Congress shall make no law …
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,’” but then goes on to note that, “[a]t the
same time, our cases have not left Congress or the States powerless to address the most
serious problems.” Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 518
U.S. 727, 740 (1996).
158
See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006) (citing Arkansas Writers'
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) as “invalidating state sales tax under the Free
Press Clause”).
159 Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006) (quoting
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)); Expressions Hair Design
v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017).
160 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586, 176 L. Ed. 2d 435
(2010) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–62 (1982) (quoting Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949))).
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“freedom of the press” analysis. Although his frequency pales in
comparison to the most active referencers of the right in the height of the
frame’s usage a half-century ago, he did mention the concept twenty-eight
total times, an average of just under once a term.161 Four of these adopted
a positive tone, and the remaining twenty-four were neutral references.
Although a number of Thomas’ mentions were concentrated in a few
opinions that directly quote the text of the First Amendment,162 he
continued to mention the concept over time, including as recently as the
2018 and 2019 Terms. But Thomas presents a peculiar dynamic: the
Court’s top user of the press-freedom framing is also widely understood to
be the most aggressive advocate for a scaleback of foundational press
protections. For example, four of his most recent references to press
freedom came in his concurrence in denial of certiorari in McKee v. Cosby,
an opinion that scholars viewed as one of the most press-threatening
opinions of the modern era, urging the abandonment of the foundational
New York Times v. Sullivan standard.163 While not specifically tracked as
part of our broader empirical study, these observations about Justice
Thomas’s practice of sandwiching “freedom of the press” references within
negative tonal discussions of the press (and alongside broad assertions that
the Founders would not have protected the press in the circumstances), give
context to the ways in which even the rare references to the concept from
Justices of the current Court may not be contributing to an ongoing viable
right of meaningful constitutional dimension.
In total, our quantitative data on the current Court’s extremely limited
references to the constitutional right of press freedom, coupled with our
observations about the specific contexts accompanying that rhetoric,
strongly suggest that the U.S. Supreme Court has experienced a farreaching institutional change. The broad-based, Court-wide recognition of

161 Thomas was confirmed on October 15, 1991 and had served on the court for 28.97 years

as
of
this
study
[July
2020].
Clarence
Thomas,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Clarence_Thomas_(Supreme_Court).
162
Fourteen of Thomas’s paragraphs, accounting for half of his total mentions, were
contained in a single case, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)
(holding that a prohibition on anonymous campaign literature violates the First
Amendment).
163
See McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675 (2019) (J. Thomas, concurring in denial of
certiorari); see also Steve Vladek, Trump's Attacks on the First Amendment and the Press
Gain an Ally in Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, NBC NEWS (Feb. 20, 2019),
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trump-s-attacks-first-amendment-press-gain-allysupreme-court-ncna973431 (stating that “Thomas’s analysis suggests that [President
Donald] Trump’s attacks on the press are resonating in some of the most important chambers
of government — and will only embolden new lawsuits seeking to weaken Sullivan and the
critical constitutional principle that it articulated.”).
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the principle has given way to a sweeping shift: the disappearance of the
freedom of the press.
V. EXPLORING POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DISAPPEARANCE
While our data unquestionably reveal that Supreme Court references to the
concept of a constitutional right of freedom of the press are disappearing,
the harder question of why they are disappearing remains. A complex set of
causal factors is surely at work, and the changing Court dynamics are
intertwined with changing media landscapes, changing press behaviors, and
changing public perceptions—in ways that scholars from a number of
disciplines have explored and will continue to investigate in the face of this
new data. Importantly, though, our dataset did provide opportunities to test
some potential explanations for these trends, including the suggestions that
the findings are solely a result of shifts in ideological makeup of the Court,
the Court’s smaller press-related docket, or the existence of settled law in
the area. Although each is an initially appealing explanation, our analysis
suggests that none fully accounts for the disappearance of the freedom of
the press.
A. Ideological Shifts at the Court
One initially appealing explanation is that the disappearance of references
to freedom of the press is solely the result of ideological shifts at the Court.
While data do provide some support for this explanation, our analyses
across a number of other measures suggest there is more behind the erasure
of press freedom than merely the Court’s changing ideological
composition.
To conduct these analyses, we mapped the probability of a press-freedom
mention onto each Justice’s Martin-Quinn score, a widely used model that
places U.S. Supreme Court Justices on a liberal-conservative ideological
spectrum.164 Higher Martin-Quinn scores indicate greater conservativism
and lower Martin-Quinn scores indicate greater liberalism.165

164

See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002);
Ward Farnsworth, The Use and Limits of Martin-Quinn Scores to Assess Supreme Court
Justices, with Special Attention to the Problem of Ideological Drift, 101 NW. U.L. REV.
COLLOQUY 143, 143–147 (2007) (describing the Martin-Quinn scoring methodology).
Updated Martin-Quinn scores are available at https://mqscores.lsa.umich.edu.
165
The historic span of Martin-Quinn ranges from a most-liberal score of less than -7, which
was Justice William O. Douglas’s rating during the periods between 1965-1975, to a mostconservative score of 4.5, which was then-Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist during
the period from 1975-1979.
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There is an intuitive logic behind the instinct to attribute the press-freedom
trend to the Justices’ ideologies. The stark modern drop-off of references
to the constitutional right did happen during a time period in which the
Supreme Court swung significantly to the right and the median MartinQuinn scores of the Justices increased.166 And the data do show that at least
some prominent liberal Justices of the previous eras were major promoters
of the concept of press freedom. The three most frequent mentioners of
freedom of the press—Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan—are all
Justices with broader records as liberals.167 Each made more than 100
separate mentions of the right over their time on the Court. Some other
notable liberal Justices of the past likewise have high frequency scores on
mentions of press freedom.168
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, when we investigate the overall historical data, we
find a link between the Justices’ ideology and their likelihood of invoking
the concept of freedom of the press. Throughout the entirety of the Court’s
history, liberal Justices have mentioned press freedom more often than
conservative Justices have.
We produced a model based on the full data since 1784 to examine the
Justices’ likelihood of characterizing the press in any framing, including a
“freedom of the press” frame.169 The model controls for both the number
166

See Michael A. Bailey, If Trump Appoints a Third Justice, the Supreme Court Would Be
the Most Conservative It’s Been Since 1950, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/22/if-trump-appoints-third-justicesupreme-court-would-be-most-conservative-its-been-since-1950/; Michael A. Bailey, Is
Today’s Court the Most Conservative in Sixty Years? Challenges and Opportunities in
Measuring Judicial Preferences, 75 J. POL. 821, 829 (2013) (quoting data suggesting “that
the contemporary Court is more conservative than any other time since 1937”); Adam
Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html (reporting “widely accepted
political science data [that] tell an unmistakable story about a notably conservative court”).
167
Justice Hugo Black referenced the right of a free press 169 times, 22 percent of which
had an affirmatively positive tone. His career-wide average Martin-Quinn score was -1.8—
more liberal than the October Term 2019 score of Justice Elena Kagan and identical in score
to Justice Stephen Breyer. Justice William O. Douglas referenced the right of a free press
129 total times, 21 percent of which had an affirmatively positive tone. Justice Douglas’s
career-wide average Martin-Quinn score was -4.9. Over a ten-year period near the end of
his time on the Court, he averaged -7 or higher, which is the most liberal Martin-Quinn score
in history. Justice William Brennan referenced the right of a free press 102 times, 25 percent
of which had an affirmatively positive tone. His career-wide average Martin-Quinn score
was -1.6.
168
Justice John Paul Stevens (Martin-Quinn score of -2.4) had 35 mentions of press
freedom. Justice Frank Murphy (Martin-Quinn score of -1.6) had 34 mentions. Chief Justice
Earl Warren (Martin-Quinn score of -1.3) had 31 mentions. Justice Thurgood Marshall
(Martin-Quinn score of -3.2) had 30 mentions.
169 This model treats each Justice-Term-frame-ideology combination as a separate
observation. Because we studied seven separate framings of the press, in each Term with
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of First Amendment opinions the Justice wrote and the number of non-First
Amendment opinions.170 Figure ___ shows the effect of ideology on a
Justice's predicted frequency of freedom of the press mentions for each
Term.
In this broad-overview model, conservatism is, in fact, associated with a
decreased tendency to reference the freedom of the press. As depicted in
the Figure, a hypothetical Justice with a Martin-Quinn score of -7.5, which
is approximately the score of Justice Douglas in the late 1960s (and the
most liberal Justice score of all time), would make 3.3 references to press
freedom per Term. A Justice with a Martin-Quinn score of -2.5, which is
approximately the score of Justice Brennan in the late 1970s, would be
predicted to make two references per term, and a Justice with a MartinQuinn score of 1.35, which was Justice Kennedy’s score in the late 1980s,
would be predicted to make 1.3 references. A Justice with a Martin-Quinn
score of 4.5, which is approximately the score of Justice Rehnquist in the
late 1970s (and most conservative score of all time), would make only about
0.9 mentions.

nine justices there are a total of 72 observations. A Justice was included in this data
regardless of whether he or she had any references for a given frame in a given Term, but
would be recorded with a zero for frames that were not invoked by the Justice. This
approach, which produces 6040 observations, produces a picture of both the mentions and
the non-mentions of the press and, when mapped onto the available Martin-Quinn ideology
data, captures all changing variation in ideology, because Martin-Quinn scores vary from
Term-to-Term.
170

The data show that 73% of press-freedom mentions take place in cases classified by the
Supreme Court Database as First Amendment cases. Controlling for this helps examine the
true variables of interest—ideology and references to freedom of the press—and addresses
the statistical concern that a Justice’s underlying proclivity to mention freedom of the
press could also be correlated with the number of opinions the Justice writes in the issue
area most closely associated with freedom of the press.
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Figure ___.

Yet this model alone does not appear to completely explain the full extent
of the disappearance of freedom of the press references we have observed.
Some of our other data on Justice ideology, moreover, cut against this
narrative and suggest there is more going on than simply the Court’s most
recent ideological shift.
Notably, for example, we find that ideology has essentially no marginal
effect on a Justice’s likelihood of depicting the freedom of the press with a
positive tone. If ideology were the primary driver of the Justices’ views of
the value of press freedom, then presumably we would see a correlation
between the Justices’ ideology and the tone with which they speak of the
concept. But this link does not exist.
To test this question, we again employed Martin-Quinn ideology data. We
charted the effect on the probability that a Justice will adopt a particular
tone within the frame when the Martin-Quinn score is shifted one unit (or
one point) toward the more conservative end of the scale.171 While ideology
“This one-unit difference is about the difference during the Court’s 2007 term between
either Chief Justice John Roberts (1.42) and Justice Anthony Kennedy (0.41) or between
171
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has an effect on tone in some frames, we find that the influence of a
Justice’s ideology on the constitutional right frame is essentially
nonexistent, meaning that, generally, liberal and conservative Justices are
equally likely to convey the more celebratory notion of freedom of the
press. Indeed, Figure 7, which depicts the interaction between ideology and
all frames, shows that for both the positive and the neutral uses of the
constitutional right framing the marginal effect of ideology on press
freedom depictions hovers near zero.

Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Antonin Scalia (2.46). It is also the approximate distance,
in the 2013 Term, between Justice Elena Kagan (-1.62) Justice Sonia Sotomayor (-2.58).”
RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, U.S. Supreme Court Characterizations of the
Press: An Empirical Study, 100 N. CAROLINA L. REV. 110 (forthcoming 2022).
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Figure 7.

This data suggest that the disappearance of positive mentions of freedom
of the press is not happening at the hand of any one ideological wing of the
Court. We also parsed the data more finely to make an investigation into
the interaction of ideology with the frame over time—looking for any
indication that ideology once had an impact on likelihood of positive usage
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but now no longer does, or vice versa. We find no significant effects.172
That is, there is no evidence that ideology has been a reliable predictor of a
Justice’s frequency of positive references to the right of press freedom
during any era of our dataset.
Focusing more closely on the work of the Justices of the modern Court
further belies the suggestion that ideology alone explains the stark decline
in press freedom references. On a more granular level—and potentially key
to thinking about the current role of ideology on press freedom—there are
simply no quantitative or qualitative data to suggest that the Court’s most
recent liberal Justices are press-freedom advocates. Indeed, at the time our
study concluded, no sitting liberal Justice had ever referenced the freedom
of the press in a positive tone. Justices Sotomayor,173 Breyer,174 and
Kagan,175 the current Justices whose Martin-Quinn scores place them
furthest to the left on the ideological spectrum,176 had made fewer than five
references to the constitutional right of freedom of the press combined in
their collective total time on the Court, and all of these were neutral in
tone.177 Justice Sotomayor, whose Martin-Quinn score marks her as the
most liberal of the current Court’s Justices, contributed no press-freedom
references to this total, as she had never once mentioned press freedom or
a free press in any way in all of her then-eleven years on the Court.178
The most frequent referencer of press freedom today is, in fact, the Court’s
most conservative Justice, Clarence Thomas—although his total number of
mentions pales in comparison to even the totals of the less frequent Justices

172

This examination was made with the aggregation and reduction of the data to the number
of neutral and positive mentions by Justice by term.
173
Justice Sotomayor’s Martin-Quinn score in 2019 was -3.48.
174 Justice Breyer’s Martin-Quinn score in 2019 was -1.87.
175 Justice Kagan’s Martin-Quinn score in 2019 was -1.62
176 Justice Ginsburg also sat on the Court through the conclusion of this study’s dataset in

July 2020. Justice Ginsburg’s Martin-Quinn score for 2019 was -2.82, the second most
liberal. She had a career-long total of only four references to press freedom, none of which
was positive in tone.
177
Justice Kagan had made one reference. Justice Breyer had made three references. Justice
Sotomayor had made none.
178 Justice Sotomayor has referenced the press more generally, but she does not make
mention of it as a constitutional freedom. See RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West,
U.S. Supreme Court Characterizations of the Press: An Empirical Study, 100 N. CAROLINA
L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2022) (noting that “when the Justices are compared by their
averages per year served on the Court, [Justice Sotomayor] is ranked first among the sitting
Justices for frequency of press mentions” and that “[i]n her 11 years on the Court, she has
referenced the press or a press function 68 times, for an average of 6.09 references per
year”).
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of the 1930s to 1980s.179 Overall, the Roberts Court conservatives have low
numbers of press-freedom mentions compared to their peers in the
preceding era, just as the Roberts Court liberals do. While Justices of all
ideological stripes once seemed to accept a foundational premise of press
freedom, there are no indicators in either the quantitative or the qualitative
data to suggest that any current Justice has active interest in the
constitutional right, particularly as any kind of operationally protective
principle for newsgatherers. At an individual-Justice level, changes in the
ideological composition of the Court do not explain the disappearance of
freedom of the press.
All told, despite some clear overarching indications of relationship between
ideology and press-freedom mentions, it does not appear to be the case that
changes in Justices’ ideology are the sole factor driving the departure of
freedom of the press from the Supreme Court’s lexicon. Justices across the
ideological spectrum were more likely to mention freedom of the press in
earlier eras and are less likely to do so now. Changes in the ideological
makeup of the Court cannot be the driving cause of the disappearance.
B. Fewer Opportunities to Reference Press Freedom
Other potential explanations for the disappearing right focus on the
possibility that it is not the language and practices of the Justices that have
changed but rather the legal and media landscapes in which they are
working. Under these views, the Roberts Court is noting the freedom of the
press less often because it has fewer opportunities to do so. But the data
likewise cast doubt on these explanations.
1. Reduction in Overall References to the Press
One theory might be that it is not “freedom of the press” that is disappearing
from the Court’s opinions but rather the broader concept of the press itself.
That is, as the country moved from an era featuring a more recognizable
institutional press to one with a more complicated media terrain, discussion
of the press declined overall, and with that decline came a natural decline
in references to press freedom. Our wider study confirms that the overall
frequency of mention of the press is itself in sharp decline in Supreme Court
opinions.180 [See Figures 8 and 9]. But this alone does not explain the
179 Justice Thomas had a 2019 Martin-Quinn score of 3.69. He has mentioned freedom of

the press 28 times in his nearly 29 years on the Court, for an average of .97 references per
year.
180 See RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, U.S. Supreme Court Characterizations
of the Press: An Empirical Study, 100 N. CAROLINA L. REV. ___, (forthcoming 2022)
(reporting that “[s]ince late 1970s, the incidence of press references has steeply declined”).
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linguistic and conceptual abandonment of “freedom of the press.” Indeed,
two important sets of data strongly suggest that something more is
happening on the press-freedom front than a simple decline in overall
attention to the press.
Figure 8.

Figure 9.
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The first is data revealing that the press freedom framing is in sharper
decline than some other framings of the press. That is, even within the
reduced numbers of overall press mentions, reference to press freedom is
on the decline. A reduction in references to freedom of the press that was
merely a reflection of the overall decline in references to the press might be
expected to have a stable proportion of press-freedom references within the
smaller, modern set of press references. As discussed in more detail in the
examination of the study’s data above,181 this is not the case. While for
much of the 1930s to 1990s, close to 30 percent of all press references
mentioned press freedom, these references are now consistently below 10
percent. Within the already diminishing total group of press references, the
constitutional right frame is being eclipsed by other frames. Notably, the
Court’s references are shifting heavily to the frame that we call the
“Communication” frame, which captures instances in which the Court
simply acknowledges an act of journalism or the use of media to make
something publicly known. Today, when the Court speaks of the press, it is
much less often in a way that affirms or recognizes freedom of the press
and much more often one of these references, merely noting that a news
story was published or that press coverage occurred.182 Perhaps even more
troubling for the press, frames that strongly correlate with negative tonal
depictions—most notably, the frame used by Justices to comment that the
181
182

See infra Part IV.B.
See supra, Part __
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press injured an individual’s privacy, reputation, or emotional well-being—
also have comparatively stronger frequency in this time period.183 It is
simultaneous with these trends that the press-freedom framing is dropping
off. Thus, while infrequency of press references may give a partial
explanation for the drop in references to press freedom, this overall decline
does not fully explain the disappearance of press freedom, which is
happening even within that reduced number of mentions.
A second, separate set of data that we gathered likewise undercuts the
proposition that the press-freedom disappearance is simply a function of
the Court discussing the press less overall. There is strong evidence that the
Court is passing up opportunities to reference freedom of the press that it
might have taken in the past. As discussed above, the ongoing vitality of
freedom of the press as a baseline concept was fueled, not solely by
references to it in cases with press-focused fact patterns but also in judicial
opinions not involving the press, which alluded to it as part of a wider First
Amendment discussion. This invocation of press freedom as what we have
called a “traveling companion” to freedom of speech once routinely
occurred in more generalized “freedom of expression” cases. These
references were, at times, arguably ambiguous in their substantive meaning
but were nonetheless significant for their preservation of press freedom as
a rhetorical and conceptual constitutional ingredient that could potentially
be employed in future press-focused cases. Justices Black and Douglas,
known for their First Amendment absolutism, regularly engaged in this
coupling of the rights,184 discussing “freedom of speech and of the press”
183

See RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, U.S. Supreme Court Characterizations
of the Press: An Empirical Study, 100 N. CAROLINA L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2022)
(descripting this frame in more detail and noting that “although the Roberts Court is a Court
that is not talking about the press all that often, when it does so, it is saying that the press is
harmful to people”).
184 See, e.g., from Justice Black: Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chi., Loc. 753 v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 301 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting) (“the
constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and the press”); Carpenters & Joiners Union
of Am., Loc. No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 732 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting)
(asserting the “Constitutional prohibition against any law abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press”); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 495 (1949)
(“guaranties of freedom of speech and press stemming from the Fourteenth and First
Amendments.”); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 269 (1957) (“our national
constitutional standard of freedom of speech and press”); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147,
157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) (“constitutional freedom of speech and press”); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60, 63 (1960) (“freedom of speech and press”); Bell v. Maryland, 378
U.S. 226, 346 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) (“freedom of speech and press”). See also from
Justice Douglas: Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (“freedom of speech and of
press”); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947) (“the unequivocal command of the First
Amendment serve as constant reminders that freedom of speech and of the press should not
be impaired”); Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 163 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“in order
to maintain freedom of press and of speech in their preferred position”); Superior Films, Inc.
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in a single breath, but they certainly were not alone in the practice.185
Throughout past eras, these “traveling companion” references situated
speech and press freedoms as coequal and complementary constitutional
rights.
To explore this practice further, we collected an additional set of data to
study the Justices’ practice of jointly mentioning the freedoms of speech
and press as part of its discussions of First Amendment rights. We gathered
data on this practice for two key time periods—the fifteen years of the
Roberts Court (2005 to 2019) and an equivalent-length fifteen-year period
a half-century earlier (1960 to 1974). For both periods, we investigated
every reference to freedom of speech for the presence of any “traveling
companions”—constitutional rights that were mentioned alongside the
speech-freedom right.

v. Dep't of Educ. of State of Ohio, Div. of Film Censorship, 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (“Congress and the States shall make ‘no law’ which abridges
freedom of speech or of the press”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 513 (1957)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (“the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and press”);
United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 117 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Congress,
being unable to abridge freedom of speech or freedom of the press”); Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 89 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The freedom of speech and of the press
guaranteed by the Constitution . . . .”); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman
of Pleasure" v. Att'y Gen. of Com. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 427 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (“The Constitution forbids abridgment of ‘freedom of speech, or of the press”);
Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966) (“freedom of speech or of the press”); Old
Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat. Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264,
290 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“free speech and free press”).
185 See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 118 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting) (“the right of free speech and a free press”); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 615
(1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“the freedom of speech or of the press.”); U.S. ex rel. Turner
v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 294 (1904) (“the vital importance of freedom of speech and of
the press”); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664 (1925) (“the liberty of speech and of
the press.”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (“freedom of speech and of the
press”); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (“Freedom of speech and of the press
are fundamental rights”); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (“the freedom
of speech and that of the press”); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940) (“The
freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution”); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 284 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[F]reedom of speech and of the press
are essential to the enlightenment of a free people and in restraining those who wield
power”); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 487 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“the
great liberties of speech and the press”); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 250
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“the protection of freedom of
speech and press”); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (“a society which places
a primary value on freedom of speech and of press”); Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S.
316, 320 (2002) (“The First Amendment's guarantee of ‘the freedom of speech, or of the
press’ prohibits a wide assortment of government restraints upon expression”); Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (“the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press”).
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Our examination reveals that freedom of the press is no longer a regular
“traveling companion” to freedom of speech in the way it once was. Figures
10 and 11 offer a comparison of the fifteen-year periods. In the period from
1960-1974, press freedom was a consistent traveling companion to freedom
of speech. In 37 percent of all paragraphs containing a reference to free
speech, the Court also referenced freedom of the press.186 Freedom of
speech traveled alongside freedom of the press far more frequently than it
traveled with any other constitutional right—nearly twice as often as the
next most common right. Indeed, during this period, freedom of speech as
a concept was accompanied by freedom of the press almost as often as it
appeared alone.

186

This period had 561 total references to freedom of speech. In 208 of them, there was also
a reference to freedom of the press.
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Figure 10.

The data from the fifteen-year period of the Roberts Court stands in stark
contrast. While in the previous period, the Court delivered hundreds of
“traveling companion” paragraphs pairing the two First Amendment rights,
the Roberts Court has done so fewer than two dozen times. All total, during
this more recent era, press freedom was a traveling companion to free
speech only six percent of the time.187 A Court that once routinely referred
to “freedom of speech and of the press” now nearly always simply refers to
“freedom of speech.” Press freedom has plummeted even among the ranks
of those rights that do occasionally find mention alongside free speech, now
eclipsed in frequency by religious freedoms, freedom of association, and
other non-First Amendment rights.
Figure 11.

The traveling companion data thus provide some clear signals that the
disappearance of the right of press freedom at the Court is not merely an
outgrowth of a decline in the overall discussion of the press. There is
powerful evidence suggesting that the Court is passing up opportunities to
reference freedom of the press that it might have taken in the past. Many of
the references that kept the concept of freedom of the press alive in earlier
187

This period had 381 total references to freedom of speech. Only 23 of them also made a
reference to freedom of the press.
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years were freedom of speech references accompanied by a deliberate
marker from the Court that free speech was one half of a vibrant two-right
combination. As addressed in more detail below, the Roberts Court has not
lacked for opportunities to make these same traveling companion
references. Indeed, a robust speech-freedom docket, with expansionary
Speech Clause protections, has been a hallmark of the era.188 But free
speech as a concept is now traveling alone, and the once persistent
companion concept of press freedom has been mostly abandoned. Thus,
while the decline in overall press references surely accounts for some of the
reduction in mentions of freedom of the press, the Court’s patterns of
referring to press freedom in non-press contexts has also dramatically
shifted, spurring a fuller disappearance across all usages.
2. Reduction in Number of Press-Specific Cases
A related, but still distinct, explanation for the decline in references to the
constitutional right of press freedom in recent years is that the Court has
been hearing fewer press-specific cases.189 Whether seen as part of the
natural ebb and flow of the Court’s docket or a predictable aftermath to the
press-active caseload of the prior decades, this argument suggests that the
Court simply no longer considers as many press issues as it once did, and,
therefore, the Justices have fewer opportunities to discuss the right of press
freedom. On closer review, however, it appears that while the makeup of
the Court’s dockets might explain some of the shift in press right references,
it does not account for the full extent of the decline.
As discussed earlier, there is deep consensus among press scholars that the
height of the press’s successes at the Supreme Court occurred during the
latter half of the twentieth century—particularly during the thirty-year
period starting in the mid-1960s.190 There is likewise widespread agreement
that the Court today has not been deciding as many cases of key
significance to the press. There are a number of potential reasons why this
For a discussion of the Roberts Court’s approach to First Amendment speech rights,
see infra Part V.
189
As discussed in Part III, discerning the constitutional status of press freedom can be a
murkier undertaking than with other provisions. The Court often speaks in ambiguous terms
that make it unclear which rights and protections emanating from the Press Clause and those
coming from the Speech Clause. There is also uncertainty about if the Court recognizes
differences between members of the “press” and non-press speakers. It also has a practice
of extending to everyone rights that are recognized primarily because of the value of the
press function. For these reasons, it is not easy to identify what factors distinguish a “press”
case from other cases, including other First Amendment cases. Must a member of the press
be a party to the case? Must the Court’s holding rest solely or explicitly on press freedom?
Must the case center on an activity or function of particular value to the press or that is
clearly distinct from speech, such as like information or newsgathering?
190
See, supra, Part III.
188
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might be so: The freefalling economics suffered by the news industry have
left the institutional press with fewer resources to fight legal battles.191
Concentrated media ownership has reduced competition among the press
and resulted in less boundary-pushing journalism.192 News organizations
might be foregoing potential legal challenges out of concern that they will
face press-unfriendly judges.193
Another possible explanation for the reduction in the number of pressrelated cases at the Court is the suggestion that there are simply fewer
unresolved press-specific issues following the spate of cases decided during
those earlier decades. While the press certainly secured a number of
important rights and protections during the post-incorporation eras, it seems
shortsighted to suggest that there are no remaining issues related to press
freedom left for the Court to decide.194 As an initial matter, there are some
press-related issues that the Court addressed during these earlier years but
did not—and still have not—fully resolved. The Court, for example, has
yet to clear up the ongoing confusion about either the existence or contours
of a constitutionally protected reporter’s privilege,195 a First Amendment
right to government information, 196 or the right of public college and
university student journalists not to be censored by their schools.197

See Tony Mauro, “We Need to Be Ready to Fight”, REPORTERS COMM. (Summer 2014),
https://www.rcfp.org/journals/news-media-and-law-summer-2014/we-need-be-ready-fight/
(quoting media attorney Ted Boutrous stating, “major media organizations used to be much
more willing to spend time and money to fight major First Amendment battles.”).
192
See Losing the News: The Decimation of Local Journalism and the Search for Solutions,
PEN AMERICA 5 (Nov. 20, 2019), https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Losing-theNews-The-Decimation-of-Local-Journalism-and-the-Search-for-Solutions-Report.pdf
(stating that after news organizations face economic obstacles “consolidation and cost
cutting gut newsrooms, beats remain uncovered, and corruption goes uninvestigated, the
American populace lacks vital information about their lives and their communities.”).
193
See Mauro, “We Need to Be Ready to Fight,” supra note __ (quoting media attorney Ted
Boutrous stating, “there is a sense among some that the current court is hostile to freedom
of the press and that it is too risky to ask the court to weigh in on important issues.”).
194
As discussed, infra in Part __, moreover, the large number of issues involving freedom
of speech decided during this period has not stopped the Roberts Court from continuing to
find cases that raise new free speech questions.
195
See Brief Amici Curiae of ABC, Inc., et al. Miller v. United States of America, 2005 WL
1199075 (U.S.); Sari Horwitz & Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Refuses to Take Reporter’s
Case on Revealing Confidential Source, WASH. POST (June 2, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-refuses-to-take-reporters-caseon-revealing-confidential-source/2014/06/02/d704de58-ea54-11e3-9f5c9075d5508f0a_story.html.
196
See Matthew Schafer, Does Houchins Matter? (forthcoming 2021).
197
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (“We need not now
decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored
expressive activities at the college and university level.”); Brief of Amici Curiae Student
Press Law Center, et al., Hosty v. Carter, 2005 WL 2736314 (U.S.) (“Because of the
191
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A review of the litigation activities of advocacy groups in these areas
likewise reveals a host of other unresolved legal questions that affect the
press. These include issues such as the risks for journalists and their sources
under the Espionage Act,198 protections against government surveillance of
the press,199 the targeting and arrest of journalists by law enforcement,200
government censorship on digital platforms such as social media,201
restrictions on the ability of government employees to talk to the press or
to share certain information publicly,202 the unsealing of court records,203
the right to record law enforcement officials,204 and warrantless searches of
electronic devices at the border.205
But even accepting that there has been a decrease in the number of pressrelated cases at the Court, the question remains whether that smaller press
docket fully accounts for the drop-off in references to press freedom. Or,
alternatively, are today’s Justices not taking advantage of opportunities in
the cases they are deciding to mention the right that past Justices likely
would have embraced? To consider these questions further, we sought to
identify potentially viable opportunities for more recent Justices to
acknowledge the constitutional right of press freedom by examining cases
where members of the press were not parties to the proceedings, yet where
growing confusion and conflict among the lower courts on this important
question, amici believe the time has come for this Court to provide an answer.”).
198
See Jameel Jaffer, The Espionage Act and the Growing Threat to Press Freedom, THE
NEW YORKER (June 25, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/theespionage-act-and-a-growing-threat-to-press-freedom.
199
See Mailyn Fidler, Police Camera Surveillance Threatens First Amendment Interests,
REPORTERS COMM. (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.rcfp.org/tech-press-freedom-feb-21-2021/;
Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 14 F.4th 276 (4th Cir. 2021)
(disclosure requirements of sensitive associational information).
200
Elahe Izadi, Iowa Reporter Acquitted in a Trial that Shocked Press Freedom Advocates,
WASH. POST (March 10, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/media/2021/03/10/iowareporter-arrested-andrea-sahouri-trial-verdict/; Goyette v. City of Minneapolis, 338 F.R.D.
109 (D. Minn. 2021).
201
Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Paxton, No. 1:21-cv-307 (W.D.
Tex.).
202
See Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 11 F.4th 810
(D.C. Cir. 2021) (addressing “prepublication review” requirements of intelligence-agency
employees and military personnel); Cato Inst. v. SEC, 4 F.4th 91 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (gag
orders of public officials).
203
United States v. Acosta, REPORTERS COMM., https://www.rcfp.org/litigation/unitedstates-v-acosta/.
204
Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, 982 F.3d 813 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 142
S. Ct. 560 (2021).
205
See Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom. Merch. v.
Mayorkas, 141 S. Ct. 2858, 210 L. Ed. 2d 964 (2021); Seth Harp, I’m a Journalist but I
Didn’t Fully Realize the Terrible Power of U.S. Border Officials Until They violated My
Rights
and
Privacy,
THE
INTERCEPT
(June
22,
2019),
https://theintercept.com/2019/06/22/cbp-border-searches-journalists/.
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news organizations and press advocates filed amicus briefs highlighting
potential press freedom issues. A review of these cases revealed that despite
press organizations attempting to bring the Justices’ attention to the impact
of various issues on the free press and explaining how these cases fit under
the press freedom framework, the Roberts Court Justices frequently did not
include references to press freedom in their opinions. This was the case,
moreover, even in cases with some similarity to earlier cases in which these
Justices’ predecessors had acknowledged the constitutional right of press
freedom.
In the Court’s 2010 decision of Citizens United v. FEC, for example, the
Roberts Court considered whether a campaign finance law regulating the
distribution of a political documentary violated the First Amendment. The
Court heard oral argument in the case twice. Before the first argument, the
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, a press advocacy
organization, filed an amicus brief emphasizing the value of the work of the
news media and situating the issues within a press freedom framework. The
brief contended that the law raised potential risks for the “free press” and
that it violated the “freedom of speech and of the press.”206 Less than a year
later, before reargument of the case, the Reporters Committee filed another
brief again stressing the constitutional press freedom issues at stake. It
specifically asked the Court to clarify the relationship between some of its
past decisions and “the First Amendment’s protection of the press.”207 In
response, another group of news organizations filed an amici brief arguing
in support of the other side—saying that the campaign finance provision
sufficiently protected the First Amendment rights of journalists.208 Indeed,
at least six other briefs filed by various groups in this case discussed the
issues, at least in part, on press freedom grounds. These groups did not
necessarily agree on the specific issues in the case or on the meaning of
press freedom. But they all considered it to be relevant on some level, if
even merely as a “traveling companion” to freedom of speech. Yet, despite
this, the majority decision in Citizens United contains no reference to the
constitutional right to freedom of the press and instead grounds its
discussion solely in the freedom of speech.209

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 2009 WL 132714 (U.S.), 12 (U.S., 2009).
Reporters Committee Supplemental Br., Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, 2009 WL 2219299 (U.S.), 2 (U.S., 2009).
208
Supplemental Brief of the Center for Independent Media, Calitics.com., Eyebeam, Zack
Exley, Laura McGann, & the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law as Amici
Curiae in Support of Appellee,
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 2009 WL 2365229 (U.S.), 1 (U.S.,2009).
209
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010). Justice Antonin
Scalia’s concurrence and Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent, however, do mention and
debate the right of press freedom; see also Michael McConnell (arguing that the “most
206
207
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A sampling of other cases shows a similar pattern: In the 2017 case of
Packingham v. North Carolina, the Court reviewed a state law prohibiting
sex offenders from accessing certain social media websites. Press advocates
told the Court in amici briefs that the case presented issues that affected the
First Amendment rights “of speech and press” and “the press’s First
Amendment right to distribute news.”210 Yet in its opinion in Packingham,
the Court did not once mention the word “press” and instead focused its
entire discussion on “the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.”211
Likewise, in the 2018 case of Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, the Court
was asked to determine whether a man was constitutionally arrested after
he spoke critically of government officials at a city council meeting. Briefs
by multiple amici and one of the parties debated how the case interacted
with the constitutional right to press freedom.212 The Court’s opinion,
however, again contained no press right references.213 As a final example,
in 2018, twenty press amici explicitly told the Court that it should consider
the Fourth Amendment’s historic role in protecting “the freedom of the
press” as part of its decision in Carpenter v. United States, regarding
whether law enforcement officials could obtain cell phone location site
information without a warrant.214 In the end, however, even though the
Justices were deeply divided five-to-four on the main issues in Carpenter,
they were united in their decision not to mention the constitutional right to
a free press in any form in any of the five published opinions.215
These cases can be compared to some of the Court’s opinions from earlier
periods when the Justices frequently referenced the constitutional right of
press freedom in cases that did not involve news media organizations as
parties—and sometimes in cases that did not even involve a First
Amendment issue at all. As mentioned earlier, for example, the underlying
important flaw” of Citizens United was analyzing it under the Speech Clause and not the
Press Clause).
210
Brief Amici Curiae of The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and The
Thomas Jefferson Center for Protection of Free Expression in Support of Petitioner,
Packingham v. North Carolina, 2016 WL 7438450 (U.S.), 9 (U.S., 2016).
211
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733, (2017).
212
See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae for Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project and
Brechner Center for Freedom of Information in Support of Petitioner, Lozman v. City of
Riviera Beach, Fla., 2017 WL 6804623 (U.S.), 6 (U.S., 2017) (arguing that “this case raises
First Amendment free press concerns, not simply free speech and petition interests”); Brief
Amici Curiae of National Press Photographers Association and 25 Media and Free Speech
Organizations in Support of Petitioner, Lozman v. The City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 2017
WL 6804624 (U.S.), 6 (U.S., 2017) (arguing that “freedom the press is at risk” in the case).
213
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018).
214
Brief Amici Curiae of The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and 19 Media
Organizations in Support of Petitioner, Carpenter v. United States of America, 2017 WL
3530966 (U.S.), 9 (U.S., 2017).
215
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262 (2018).
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issue in Citizen United was about the constitutionality of government
limitations on the broadcast and distribution of a political film.216 In
previous eras, however, the Court also considered various regulations on
the exhibition and distribution of motion pictures, such as the 1952 case,
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson.217 Like Citizens United, the Burstyn case
did not have a news media organization as a party, yet unlike in Citizens
United, the Court in the earlier case included repeated mentions of press
freedom.218
The Roberts Court’s Packingham decision, meanwhile, can be compared to
the 1940 case of Thornhill v. Alabama where the Court considered the arrest
of two union workers for “loitering and picketing” outside of a woodprocessing plant during a labor strike. Neither Thornhill nor Packingham
involves a news media party, although they both implicate questions about
the government’s use of criminal law to target disfavored speakers and stop
them from potentially reaching certain audiences. But unlike Packingham,
the Court in Thornhill made multiple references to the constitutional right
of press freedom.219
The examples continue. In the 1960 case of Wilkinson v. U.S., the Court
addressed a situation with echoes to the question in Lozman. In Wilkinson,
the petitioner was criminally convicted after he refused to answer questions
before the House Committee on Un-American Activities and publicly
disputed the legality of the Congressional investigation into possible
affiliations with the Communist Party. 220 Thus, in both Wilkinson and
Lozman, the Justices were tasked with considering the constitutional
implications of government officials wielding criminal charges against
speakers who publicly challenge them. But unlike Lozman, the Justices in
Wilkinson repeatedly included references to press freedom.221 Finally, a
1961 case, Marcus v. Search Warrants,222 can be juxtaposed against
Carpenter in that both cases examined the Fourth Amendment limitations
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part & dissenting in part) (“All that the parties dispute is whether Citizens United had a
right to use the funds in its general treasury to pay for broadcasts during the 30-day period.”);
McConnell, supra n. __ (“It is important to underscore that Citizens United was about the
production and dissemination of a documentary film critical of a candidate for office, and
not about contributions to a candidate, party, political organization, or political action
committee (PAC).”).
217
343 U.S. 495 (1952).
218
See id. at 502 (“For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that expression by means of
motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.”).
219
Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
220
Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
221
Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 406 (1961).
222
367 U.S. 717, 718 (1961).
216
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on government searches against non-press actors. The Court in Marcus,
however, did precisely what the Roberts Court did not do in the Carpenter
case (despite the press advocates’ requests)—acknowledge the historical
relationship between Fourth Amendment protections and freedom of the
press. Writing for the Court, Justice William Brennan stated that
“[h]istorically the struggle for freedom of speech and press in England was
bound up with the issue of the scope of the search and seizure power.”223
Thus, the argument that the Roberts Court has not had the same
opportunities to discuss the constitutional right to press freedom does not
fully account for the reduction in references to it. Rather, review of the
cases suggests that the Justices from prior eras appeared to have press
freedom more front of mind and included references to the right more
naturally in a variety of contexts. In contrast, the more-recent Justices have
developed a habit of omitting mentions to the right, even in spite of the
efforts of press advocates to draw the spotlight to it.
3. Press Freedom and the Roberts Court’s First Amendment
The suggestion that the significant drop in mentions of the constitutional
right of press freedom during the Roberts Court era is due to a dearth in
opportunities for the Justices to recognize the right rings all the more hallow
in light of the Roberts Court’s reputation as a Court with an active—and at
times groundbreaking—interest in First Amendment rights.
Setting aside any debates about the correctness of its rulings, the Roberts
Court can hardly be accused of overlooking issues of expressive
freedoms.224 In fact, according to a study by Ronald Collins and David
Hudson, the Court decided 56 free speech cases between 2005 and 2020.225
Time and again, moreover, the Roberts Court Justices have upheld or
seriously entertained novel or boundary-pushing First Amendment
arguments, and they did so in cases where, in the eyes of many observers,
the connection between the underlying activities and traditional free speech
values were more tangential than in the past. The Court, for example,
considered free speech issues in cases involving animal snuff films,226

223

Marcus v. Search Warrants of Prop. at 104 E. Tenth St., Kansas City, Mo., 367 U.S. 717,
724, (1961).
224
See Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited: How Chief Justice Roberts Orchestrated the
Citizens
United
Decision,
THE
NEW
YORKER
(MAY
14,
2012),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/21/money-unlimited (noting that “[i]n the
Roberts Court, there was often a broad consensus about protecting freedom of speech.”).
225
Ronald Collins & David Hudson, John Roberts: Mr. First Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG
(July 21, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/07/john-roberts-mr-firstamendment/.
226
U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
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offensive or disparaging trademarks,227 credit card fees,228 union dues,229
vanity license plates,230 student athlete recruitment,231 commercial
disclosure of doctors’ drug-prescribing records,232 bigoted protests near
military funerals,233 and the sale of violent video games to minors without
parental consent.234
Furthermore, even in cases in which the potential free speech issues were
more similar to those considered in prior eras, the Roberts Court Justices
still often surprised commentators by handing down rulings that took a
more expansive speech-protective stance than many had expected. They
declared, for example, that corporations have equivalent rights to people235
and that states cannot create protective zones around women entering
abortion clinics.236 They held that the government cannot punish people
who lie about winning military honors,237 impose “entirely reasonable”

227

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 198 L. Ed. 2d 366 (2017); Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct.
2294, 204 L. Ed. 2d 714 (2019).
228
Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 197 L. Ed. 2d 442 (2017).
229
Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.
Ed. 2d 924 (2018); see also id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of
“weaponizing the First Amendment, in a way that unleashes judges, now and in the future,
to intervene in economic and regulatory policy”).
230
Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 576 U.S. 200 (2015).
231
Tennessee Secondary Sch. v. Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
232
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
233
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
234
Brown v. Ent. Merch.. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
235
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also Toobin, supra
note X (describing how in Citizens United, the Court issued “a ruling that was far broader
than the one [the petitioners] had originally sought” and took “the case—and the law—in an
entirely new direction.”).
236
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014); see also Emily Jane Goodman, Supreme
Court Decision on Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones Opens the Door to Further Challenges,
THE NATION (July 1, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/supreme-courtdecision-abortion-clinic-buffer-zones-opens-door-further-challenges/ (observing that “the
fact that the decision was unanimous came as a big surprise. Although there were three
separate opinions, each with different theories, they all found the law unconstitutional.”).
237
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 183 L. Ed. 2d 574 (2012); see
also Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: The First Amendment and the Right to Lie, ABA
JOURNAL
(Sept.
5,
2012),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/the_first_amendment_and_the_right_to_lie
(calling Alvarez “one of the court’s most emphatic statements that false speech is generally
protected by the First Amendment and it is for the marketplace of ideas, and not for the
government, to decide what is true and what is false” and saying that “[w]hat
makes Alvarez surprising is that the Roberts court had generally rejected free speech claims
when the institutional interests of the government were at stake.”).
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regulations on local signage,238 or require reproductive healthcare clinics to
post factual information.239
In light of this record, both fans and critics of the Roberts Court agree on at
least this much: the Court “has dramatically expanded the reach of the First
Amendment by striking down a wide range of statutes for encroaching on
free speech rights.”240 Floyd Abrams, for example, said the Roberts Court
“deserves great credit” for its record “render[ing] First Amendmentprotective decisions in an extraordinarily broad range of cases,” while
Geoffrey Stone stated that “[t]he Roberts court has given more protection
to free speech across a larger range of areas than any of its predecessors
have — although sometimes unwisely.”241 After noting in a review of the
Court’s 2010 term that the “[f]ree-speech claimants won virtually every
case, even the close and difficult ones,” Michael McConnell concluded that
free speech jurisprudence “must be seen as this Court’s most distinctive
contribution to the ongoing judicial interpretation of our constitutional
order.”242
If press freedom relies on Justices who notice, appreciate, and acknowledge
underlying expressive values, then it would be natural to assume that a
Court that is known for its purportedly broad protection of First
Amendment values would also fully embrace press freedom. Yet our data
reveal that this is not the case. As expansive as it might be in some ways,
the Roberts Court’s particular vision of the First Amendment is not one that
prioritizes the constitutional protection of the free press.
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Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015).
Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 201 L. Ed. 2d 835 (2018);
see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Constitutional Gerrymandering Against
Abortion Rights: NIFLA v. Becerra, 94 NYU L. REV. 61 (2019),
https://escholarship.org/content/qt37c3c481/qt37c3c481_noSplash_bb9710b2242204823fc
d8721db747086.pdf (arguing that the Court’s decision “is only secondarily about speech.
… The Court ignored legal precedent, failed to weigh the interests at stake in its decision,
and applied a more demanding standard based on content of speech.”).
240
Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, Chief Justice Roberts Is Reshaping the First Amendment,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (March 20, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/chief-justiceroberts-is-reshaping-the-first-amendment/.
241
Steve Chapman, The John Roberts Court: Champion of Free Speech, CHI. TRIBUNE (July
26, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/columns/steve-chapman/ct-john-roberts-courtfree-speech-20170726-column.html.
242
Michael McConnell, A Free Speech Year at the Court, FIRST THINGS (Oct. 2011),
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2011/10/a-free-speech-year-at-the-court; see
also
Ronald Collins & David Hudson, John Roberts: Mr. First Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/07/john-roberts-mr-first-amendment/ (noting that there
is “something remarkable in how the Roberts Court has re-conceptualized the way we think
about certain free speech issues and has likewise reinvigorated a measure of free speech
liberty, albeit to the consternation of many.”).
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The growing chorus of scholarly critics of the Roberts Court’s free speech
jurisprudence will likely be unsurprised by the revelation that the Court has
left certain types of speech outside the ambit of its much-celebrated free
speech expansionism. Over the past decade, an increasing number of
academics and commentators have argued that the Court’s approach
primarily favors only particular speakers or messages, while leaving others
with far less-vibrant protections.243 When assessing the Justices’ First
Amendment decisions, Heidi Kitrosser has explained that the calculus
requires “not a mere matter of tallying free speech wins and losses,” but
also recognizing “the importance of the speech that they fail to protect.”244
The Roberts Court, for example, has actively defended the rights of
corporate and commercial speakers,245 but it has allowed the government to
regulate, at times severely, the speech of students,246 unions,247 prisoners,248
and government workers.249 Gregory Magarian refers to the Court’s
selective record on expressive liberties as a preference for “managed
speech,” which he describes as a First Amendment jurisprudence that
“concentrates managerial power over public discussion in the government
or in favored private actors.”250 Kathleen Sullivan depicts it as “a triumph
of the libertarian over the egalitarian vision of free speech.”251 In other
words, Sullivan suggests that the Court has endorsed a view that “treats
with skepticism all government efforts at speech suppression that might
skew the private ordering of ideas”252 as opposed to one centered on the
protection of “marginal, dissident, or unpopular viewpoints that are likely
243

See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723 (2011).
Heidi Kitrosser, Public Employee Speech and Magarian’s Dynamic Diversity,
95 WASH. U.L. REV 1405, 1406 (2018).
245
See Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118 COLUM.
L. REV. 2117 (“These days, the winners in First Amendment cases are much more likely to
be corporations and other economically and politically powerful actors.”); Tim Wu, The
Right to Evade Regulation: How Corporations Hijacked the First Amendment, THE NEW
REPUBLIC (June 3, 2013), http://newrepublic.com/article/113294/how-corporationshijacked-first- amendment-evade-regulation.
246
See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
247
See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448
(2018).
248
See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 US 521 (2006).
249
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
250
GREGORY MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST AMENDMENT
(2017) (“The Roberts Court, with a consistency and potency unique in the Supreme Court’s
history, has authorized established, powerful institutions strongly invested in the status quo
to exercise managerial control over public discussion, with the apparent goal and typical
result of pushing public discussion away from destabilizing, noisy margins and toward a
stable, settled center.”).
251
Kathleen Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143
(2010).
252
Id. at 145.
244
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to suffer political subordination or hostility.”253 In the view of other
scholars, the Court’s free expression jurisprudence is most aptly labeled
“First Amendment Lochnerism”—the process through which the Court has
transformed expressive rights from “weapons of the weak into one more
resource that wealthy interests could deploy to preserve their
advantages.”254
The constitutional value of press freedom is, of course, different in
significant ways from the disfavored speech described by these scholars.
While freedom of the press historically has been critically important as a
protection for some unpopular and disfavored voices, the free press does
not exclusively consist of inherently marginalized voices, nor does it
always embody unpopular viewpoints. In fact, the institutional press can be
a uniquely powerful speaker in many contexts. Yet the free press in all of
its forms shares important qualities with these other disfavored categories
that likewise make its steady disappearance from the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment canon highly concerning. By design, the press functions as a
counterbalance to the government, which thus threatens the “managerial
power” of government actors (as described by Magarian) and makes
members of the press more likely to be targets of government hostility (as
noted by Sullivan). And while the American press is not necessarily weak
(the trait identified by the scholars of First Amendment Lochnerism), it
functions to equalize the balance of power between the people and their
government through government scrutiny and the dissemination of
information of public concern.255
Whatever the appropriate description of the Roberts Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence, our study contributes an important additional
observation: this jurisprudence does not include any meaningful conception
of freedom of the press. In contrast to their purportedly open embrace of
freedom of speech, the Roberts Court Justices have turned away from the
freedom of the press. When it comes to speech rights in many contexts,
these Justices have adopted stances of inclusion and even, at times, nearabsolutism256—expanding the concepts to new speakers and new activities,
253

Id. at 148.

254 Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment,

118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953 (2018); see also Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS.
L. REV. 133 (2016); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism,
116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915 (2016).
255
See Sonja R. West, The Majoritarian Press Clause, 2020 U. CHI. L.F. 311, 314 (2020)
(discussing the role of the Press Clause as a structural protection of “our collective,
majoritarian right to a republican form of government.”).
256
See Ronald Collins, Exceptional Freedom-The Roberts Court, First Amendment, and
the New Absolutism, 76 ALBANY L REV. 409 (2013).
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while increasingly rejecting any potential limits or regulations. Yet, at the
same time, they have starved the right of press freedom of oxygen by
seemingly erasing it from its prior platform of rhetorical prominence.
VI. CONCLUSION
Freedom of the press—a principle once roundly recognized by Justices of
all stripes at the U.S. Supreme Court—is disappearing. On every
meaningful measure captured by our dataset, the frequency of
acknowledgement of the right is in sharp decline. No Justices on the current
Court invoke the concept with any regularity, and a contextual review of
their rare passing references suggests there are no remaining advocates of
the right. Missing from the current Court’s lexicon are not only the glowing
positive endorsements of a free press as vital, valuable, or crucial to
democracy, but also the bare, passing references to the concept that once
appeared with great frequency. Although the social, judicial, and
technological factors that have combined to bring about this change are
surely complex, our data do rule out that the desertion of the concept is
solely a result of the Court’s shifting ideology. They also cast serious doubt
on the notion that the issue is simply one of a scaleback of references to the
press more generally, a reduction in the Court’s press-focused docket, or
other lack of opportunity to refer to freedom of the press. Indeed, the
evidence is entirely to the contrary. The Roberts Court has built a reputation
of actively and expansively engaging cases that speak to principles of First
Amendment expressive freedom—the very sorts of cases that our data show
would unquestionably have given rise to a reference to press freedom a
generation ago. A Court that is otherwise capacious in its First Amendment
acknowledgements has all but deleted a major First Amendment value from
the conversation.
The institutional press itself is changing—and may even be disappearing—
but the press and the press function of course continue to exist, and a stable
democracy requires continued recognition of the overarching principle of
press freedom. Indeed, a powerful academic movement at this moment has
turned its attention to the invigoration of the Press Clause precisely because
scholars and commentators recognize the critical value of protecting these
functions in a new media landscape.
The lesson from our data is that this movement needs a more fundamental
starting point. Conversations about the scope and contours of the freedom
of the press should take shape with a recognition that the current Court’s
rhetorical and conceptual acknowledgement of the freedom is at an historic
low.
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